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SEEK JUSTICE, NOT JUST DEPORTATION: 
HOW TO IMPROVE PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
Erin B. Corcoran 
          Bipartisan politics has prevented meaningful reform to a system 
in dire need of solutions: immigration. Meanwhile, there are eleven 
million noncitizens with no valid immigration status that currently 
reside in the United States, and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) does not have the necessary resources to effect their removal. 
DHS does have the authority through prosecutorial discretion to 
prioritize these cases and provide relief to individuals with compelling 
circumstances that warrant humanitarian consideration; nonetheless, 
DHS’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion is underutilized, 
inconsistently applied, and lacks transparency. This Article suggests a 
remedy—that the immigration prosecutor’s role should be redefined to 
be one more akin to a criminal prosecutors’, with a concomitant 
obligation to seek justice. Others have argued that DHS prosecutorial 
discretion should be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking and a 
presumption of judicial review. However, if prosecutorial discretion is 
to remain a solidly executive branch prerogative to counter legislation 
painted with too broad a brush (a defect of almost all legislation) and a 
mechanism to prioritize individuals for deportation, such as violent 
repeat criminal offenders, it should be shielded from rulemaking and a 
presumption of judicial review. 
          While immigration prosecutors are trained to support granting 
relief in cases where the evidence and law support a grant of relief, they 
do not see their role as separate from DHS agents and adjudicators, 
and thus do not see it as their role to seek justice. This Article 
contributes to the ongoing scholarship and dialogue, calling for 
heightened ethical obligations, guidelines, and principles for attorneys 
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appearing before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) 
to meet the challenges of practicing immigration law, while promoting 
efficiency and fairness in an effort to restore confidence and justice to a 
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The landscape of federal immigration law has changed 
dramatically over the last 90 years. While once there was only a 
narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad 
discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms 
over time have expanded this class of deportable offenses and limited 
the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequence of 
deportation.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are approximately eleven million noncitizens in the 
United States without valid immigration status.2 Many of these 
individuals have compelling circumstances—including close family 
ties and the possibility of future immigration relief through 
comprehensive immigration reform—which warrant humanitarian 
consideration.3 There are simply insufficient resources available to 
pursue every noncitizen for every immigration violation, especially 
for those whose removal is not a high priority to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).4 And even with congressional relief on 
the horizon for a subset of noncitizens currently residing in the 
United States without valid immigration status, there will continue to 
 
 1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010). 
 2. Jeffery S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and 
State Trends 2010, PEW RES. CENTER 1 (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files 
/reports/133.pdf (estimating that as of March 2010, the unauthorized immigrant population in the 
United States is 11.2 million). 
 3. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & RUTH WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43097, 
COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM IN THE 113TH CONGRESS: MAJOR PROVISIONS IN 
SENATE PASSED S.744 (2013), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports 
/crsdocuments/R43099_07102013.pdf (summarizing Senate bill, S. 744). 
 4. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner Comm’r Immigration & Naturalization Serv. on 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Memorandum from Doris 
Meissner] (instructing INS officers to consider a variety of factors when determining whether a 
case warrants a favorable exercise of discretion including immigration status, including, but not 
limited to: lawful permanent resident status, length of residence in the United States, criminal 
history, humanitarian concerns, immigration history, likelihood of ultimately removing the alien, 
likelihood of achieving enforcement goal by other means, whether the alien is eligible or likely to 
become eligible for other relief, effect of action on future admissibility, honorable U.S. military 
service, community attention, and available resources). 
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be numerous other noncitizens who are deemed a low priority to 
deport by the United States.5 
This Article does not wade into what immigration reform should 
look like; rather the focus is on how to fix the existing process to 
achieve more just results. DHS has the authority to decide who to 
deport, as well as who to let remain in the United States through the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion;6 however, this discretion, as 
applied, must be enhanced to achieve just results.7 This Article 
contributes to the task of improving the use of prosecutorial 
discretion and professionalizing the role of Immigration and Custom 
Enforcement (ICE) trial attorneys—DHS’s immigration prosecutor. 
The Court in Padilla v. Kentucky8 aptly noted the lack of judicial 
discretion or intervention to provide any ameliorative relief to 
immigrants.9 Prosecutorial discretion may be the only mechanism 
outside of legislative action that appreciates an immigrant’s 
individual circumstances and “alleviate[s] the harsh consequence of 
deportation.”10 Prosecutorial discretion is the executive branch’s tool 
to prioritize cases when resources are limited, to target certain types 
of undesirable activity, and to minimize the effect of any law it 
deems to be overly broad.11 Yet, there has been quite a bit of 
criticism levied against how and when DHS has utilized this 
executive branch power. 
 
 5. Side-by-Side Comparison of 2013 Senate Immigration Bill with 2006 and 2007 Senate 
Legislation, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 4 (Apr. 2013). 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. See infra Part III.A. 
 8. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 9. Id. at 363–64. For purposes of this Article, the term immigrants is used as a lay term to 
define any non-U.S. citizen/national who could also be defined as an alien pursuant to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012). Immigration law does 
draw a legal distinction, under INA § 1101(a)(15), between individuals who are immigrants and 
individuals who are nonimmigrants. Under this section, an immigrant that is a noncitizen coming 
to the United States with the intent to remain permanently in the United States. In contrast, also 
under this section, a nonimmigrant is a noncitizen coming to the United States on a temporary 
basis and intends to return to his or her home country. This distinction is irrelevant for purposes 
of this Article. I have consciously decided to not use the word alien to describe non-U.S. 
citizens/nationals because the word is derogatory. See Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. 
Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 UNIV. OF MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 282–83 (1997) (arguing the use of the word “alien” to describe a 
noncitizen solidifies cultural and racial stereotypes). 
 10. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360; see Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 4, at 10. 
 11. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 354 (2014) 
(supporting the executive branch’s use of enforcement policies to adapt general laws to individual 
cases, dynamic regulatory environments, and social and political change). 
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The criticism is divided generally into two camps. One set of 
criticism stems from the concern that the prosecutors at DHS—ICE 
trial attorneys12—do not use this discretionary power enough13 in 
individual cases and that the exercise of the discretion is potentially 
arbitrary as well as lacking in transparency.14 These advocates point 
to compelling cases in which ICE trial attorneys refused to consider 
the individual circumstances and the impact of removal on the 
individual’s family and community.15 
The second set of criticism questions the constitutionality of the 
executive branch’s use of prosecutorial discretion to minimize the 
effects of what the executive branch deems to be bad law, 
particularly when DHS exercises its prosecutorial discretion 
authority to provide relief to large classes of immigrants.16 This set 
of criticisms was reinvigorated in July 2012 by the president’s 
directive, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which 
provides temporary protection from removal to a select group of 
immigrants who came to this country as children, but have no valid 
immigration status (the DREAMers17) and want to go to college or 
 
 12. In removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, an ICE trial attorney represents the government. ICE is a bureau within DHS. If either 
party appeals the case to a federal circuit court, typically an attorney from the Office of 
Immigration Litigation (OIL), a subdivision of the Civil Division at the U.S. Department of 
Justice, represents the government in the federal appeal.  
 13. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and 
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H.L. REV. 1, 28 (2012) [hereinafter Sharing Secrets] 
(citing the American Bar Association’s testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
May 17, 2011, where the ABA stated “[p]riortization, including the prudent use of prosecutorial 
discretion, is an essential function of any adjudication system. Unfortunately, it has not been 
widely utilized in the immigration context.” (citation omitted)). 
 14. Id. at 48–51 (discussing a lack of transparency in the decision-making process by 
immigration officials on the issue of whether or not to grant deferred action to an individual). 
 15. See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Immigration Law, 9 U. CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244–45 (2010) [hereinafter Role of 
Prosecutorial Discretion] (arguing that prosecutorial discretion, as applied in the immigration 
context, should have guidelines subject to notice and comment due to the inconsistent application 
of discretion by DHS prosecutors). 
 16. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEXAS L. 
REV. 781, 785 (2013) (maintaining that DACA violates the Take Care Clause). 
 17. This group of individuals are referred to as “DREAMers” because they are the 
beneficiaries of comprehensive immigration relief legislation that has been introduced multiple 
times in Congress entitled the “Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act” or the 
“DREAM Act.” Since 2001, there have been at least twenty-five bills introduced that provide 
some path to legal residency for certain unauthorized immigrants who have completed qualified 
higher education or military service, and have requisite years of continuous presence in the 
United States. See Elisha Barron, Recent Development, the Development Relief, and Education 
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have served in the military.18 Following the DACA announcement, 
criticism was abundant. Within the legal academy, scholars began to 
debate the constitutionality of the president’s action,19 while the U.S. 
 
for Alien Minors (DREAM Act), 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 632–37 (2011) (summarizing the 
failed attempts to enact various versions of the DREAM Act from 2001–2011). While each 
DREAM Act bill differs slightly, most versions contemplate enabling certain unauthorized 
noncitizen students to obtain legal permanent resident (LPR) status through a two-stage process. 
First, the individual obtains a conditional status by demonstrating that he or she has at least five 
years of residence in the United States and a high school diploma, its equivalent, or admission 
into an institution of higher learning. Second, the individual, upon completion of two-year 
bachelor’s degree or higher degree program, or two years of military service, can apply for legal 
permanent resident status. ADNORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33863, 
UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN STUDENTS: ISSUES AND “DREAM ACT” LEGISLATION 3 (2012), 
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33863.pdf. (summarizing California’s attempt to 
provide in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants residing in the state). In the 111th Congress 
(2009–2010) alone, the following DREAM Act bills were introduced: Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, S. 729, 111th Cong. (2009); Development, Relief, 
and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, S. 3827, 111th Cong. (2010) (introduced in the 
U.S. Senate); Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, S. 3962, 
111th Cong. (2010) (introduced in the U.S. Senate); Development, Relief, and Education for 
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, S. 3963, 111th Cong. (2010) (introduced in the U.S. Senate); 
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act S. 3992, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (U.S. Senate voted 59–40 to table a motion to proceed to bill to clear the way for the 
House-approved DREAM Act amendment to H.R. 5281, a comprehensive immigration bill); 
Removal Clarification Act, H.R. 5281, 111th Cong. (2010) (containing DREAM Act language) 
(the House of Representatives approved the bill by voice vote but it died in the U.S. Senate, when 
the Senate failed to invoke cloture on a vote of 55–41 (60 votes required to obtain cloture)); 
American Dream Act, H.R. 1751, 111th Cong. (2010); Development, Relief, and Education for 
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, H.R. 6497, 111th Cong. (2010); Citizenship and Service Act, H.R. 
6327, 111th Cong. (2010). In the 112th Congress (2011–2012): Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011); Development, Relief, 
and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. (2011); Adjusted 
Residency for Military Service Act, H.R. 3823, 112th Cong. (2011); and Comprehensive 
Immigration Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (2011) (referred to Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary). 
 18. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, 
to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Patrol (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter 
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1 
-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. Relying on 
DHS’s existing prosecutorial authority, on June 15, 2012, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano 
implemented the DACA directive by issuing an agency-wide memorandum instructing all 
departments within DHS to stop initiating deportation proceedings against DREAMers living in 
the United States. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens to 
Dirs., Special Agents, and Chief Counsel (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Memorandum from John 
Morton on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure 
-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. 
 19. Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of 
Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 261 (2013) (arguing that the Obama 
administration instituted DACA due to the lack of congressional action and political expediency 
48.1 CORCORAN PAGINATED 4/16/2015  5:28 PM 
Fall 2014] SEEK JUSTICE, NOT DEPORTATION 127 
Congress questioned the limits that the president has in exercising 
prosecutorial discretion in the immigration arena.20 At the same time, 
ICE officers, along with the State of Mississippi, sued DHS under 
several legal theories, including the theory that the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA)21 explicitly prohibits immigration officers 
from exercising any discretion when arresting, detaining, or placing 
an unauthorized immigrant in removal proceedings.22 
Generally speaking, criminal prosecutors possess broad latitude 
in deciding whether to prosecute. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that “[criminal prosecutors] have this latitude because 
they are designated by statute as the president’s delegates to help him 
discharge his constitutional obligation to ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.’”23 Similarly, in civil and administrative law, the 
Supreme Court has recognized  
 
surrounding the 2012 presidential election); Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: 
Presidential Stewardship Prosecutorial Discretion and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 105, 106–07 (2014); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 16, at 785 (arguing that DACA violates 
the Take Care Clause). 
 20. See Letter from Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator, et al., to Barack H. Obama, President of 
the United States (June 19, 2012), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites 
/default/files/about/upload/061920123.pdf; Letter from Lamar Smith, Chair, House Judiciary 
Comm., to John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (July 3, 2012), 
available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/lamar-smith-letter-to-john-morton-3.pdf 
(describing the new policy as an amnesty, an overreach of executive branch authority, and a 
magnet for fraud). In these letters [hereinafter Congressional Memos Against DACA], members 
of Congress argued the new directive was unconstitutional because it usurped legislative 
authority, violated the President’s duty under the Take Care Clause, and violated administrative 
law. But see Letter from Senator Harry Reid et al. to President Barack Obama (Apr. 13, 2011), 
available at http://wwwscribd.como/doc/53014785/22-Senators-Ltr-Obama-Relief-For 
-DREAMers-4 (arguing that the President does have the authority to grant deferred action to this 
class of individuals and urging the President to exercise such authority); see also Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2013, H.R. 5855, 112th Cong. § 581 (as passed by 
House, June 7, 2012) (using the “power of the purse” (U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money 
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”)) 
the House of Representatives passed a bill stating, “[n]one of the funds made available in this Act 
may be used to finalize, implement, administer, or enforce the ‘Morton Memos’ . . . ..’”) The 
Morton Memos, which are described in detail infra at Part II.C.2, were issued by Assistant 
Secretary of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to all agents, officers, and attorneys at ICE 
and described their authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion as well as factors that should be 
considered in making that assessment. 
 21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
 22. Amended Complaint at 15, Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 
Oct. 10, 2012) (No. 12-cv-03427-O). 
 23. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 
254, 262 (1922) (“The Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice. He is the hand 
of the President in taking care that the laws of the United States in protection of the interests of 
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that an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to 
some extent the characteristics of the decision of a 
prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a 
decision which has long been regarded as the special 
province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the 
Executive who is charged by the Constitution to “take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”24  
Indeed, the Court in Heckler v. Chaney25 held that “[the] agency’s 
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or 
criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s 
absolute discretion.”26 
While the president’s DACA directive was motivated in part by 
Congress’s failure to act, it was also motivated by ICE’s failure to 
exercise favorable discretion in even the most sympathetic cases. In 
some instances, ICE or Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents 
sought removal of individuals who were eligible for deferred action 
pursuant to an interagency memorandum.27 Yet unlike criminal law, 
where only the prosecutor can bring charges, ICE trial attorneys are 
not the only officials who may bring charges. Other officers may 
institute charges, and ICE trial attorneys do not have the authority to 
dismiss these charges. In addition to ICE prosecutors, border patrol 
agents, interior enforcement agents, and hearing benefits officers28 
all have the authority to initiate the removal of an individual he or 
she has determined is not of valid immigration status. Moreover, an 
ICE attorney must seek removal pursuant to charges brought by 
 
the United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses, be faithfully executed.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 24. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
 25. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 26. Id. at 821 (holding that the Federal Drug Administration’s decision not to pursue an 
enforcement action was presumptively unreviewable, as such actions are “committed to agency 
discretion by law” under § 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act); see also Arizona v. 
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (noting that prosecutorial discretion in the 
immigration context is traditionally not subject to judicial review); United States v. Batchelder, 
442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979) (holding that prosecutors have discretion over what to charge when 
two statutes criminalize the same conduct, but have different sentencing provisions); Newman v. 
United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting that the executive branch’s decision on 
whether to institute criminal proceedings and what to charge is immune from judicial review). 
 27. See Memorandum from John Morton on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 
18, at 4. 
 28. 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2013) (listing forty-one different categories of employees at DHS who 
have the authority to fi 
le a Notice to Appear and to commence removal proceedings against a noncitizen). 
48.1 CORCORAN PAGINATED 4/16/2015  5:28 PM 
Fall 2014] SEEK JUSTICE, NOT DEPORTATION 129 
others, unless the judge dismisses the case or the charging officer 
withdrawals the Notice to Appear (NTA).29 There is no 
differentiation in the immigration system between the discretion to 
apprehend and the discretion to seek deportation. Once an eligible 
DHS agent, officer, or adjudicator30 has initiated a removal process 
through the issuing of an NTA, the immigration court commences 
proceedings.31 An ICE trial attorney then represents the government, 
regardless if the attorney made or agreed with the initial 
determination to place the noncitizen in a removal proceeding.32 
Despite functioning like a prosecutor, an immigration prosecutor 
does not have distinct power like a criminal prosecutor does—the 
immigration prosecutor is just another person responsible for 
enforcing immigration laws. And while there are numerous 
memoranda that have been issued over time by several different 
administrations as the agency’s policy has evolved,33 there is no 
single definitive guidance document for agents, nor is discretion 
limited to immigration prosecutors. Generally, in the adversarial 
legal system, lawyers must zealously represent their client before the 
tribunal34—the singular exception is the criminal prosecutor, who is 
not just an advocate but is required to seek justice.35 While ICE trial 
attorneys are trained to support the granting of relief in cases where 
the evidence and law support doing so,36 immigration prosecutors, 
 
 29. See Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement at 5, n.2 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Memorandum from William J. 
Howard], http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Howard-10-24-2005-memo 
.pdf. 
 30. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 239.1 (2012). 
 31. See Memorandum from William J. Howard, supra note 29, at 1–3. 
 32. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 (2013).  
 33. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 34. Elizabeth Keyes, Raising the Bar: The Case for Zealous Advocacy as the Guiding 
Principle in Immigration Defense, SETON HALL L. REV (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/elizabeth_keyes/4 (discussing the long tradition in the legal profession 
of zealous advocacy). 
 35. AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-1.1(b) (2d ed. 1980). 
 36. Former INS counsel David Martin notes that achieving justice is a part of the training 
that DOJ and DHS attorneys receive. He comments that “[s]uccessive general counsel and 
principal legal advisors in DHS and its predecessor agencies have made this clear and have 
reemphasized it in various ways at chief counsel conferences, meetings with field attorneys in 
their home locations, guidance memoranda, etc. As INS General Counsel, [he], often emphasized 
in such settings that attorneys were expected to ask serious questions in immigration court to 
probe a person’s narrative and also to clarify details, but at the end of that process, if persuaded of 
the account (and its legal merit), the attorney should indicate that the government supports or 
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i.e., ICE trial attorneys, do not see their role as separate and distinct 
from DHS agents and adjudicators, and as such do not see it as their 
role to seek justice.37 The number of cases where immigration judges 
are granting relief to an immigrant after the immigrant has been 
placed in removal proceedings is at an all-time high.38 
Redefining the role of the ICE trial attorneys to be one more 
akin to criminal prosecutors, with a concomitant obligation to seek 
justice, will ameliorate many of the causes that may have led to the 
president granting deferred action on a class-wide basis to 1.7 
million individuals.39 This Article contributes to the ongoing 
scholarship and dialogue calling for heightened ethical obligations, 
guidelines, and principles for attorneys appearing before the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) that meet the 
challenges of practicing immigration law, while promoting efficiency 
and fairness in an effort to restore confidence to a system subject to 
much condemnation.40 Specifically, this Article addresses structural 
problems within DHS that contribute to the flawed application of 
immigration prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-case basis. The 
Article concludes that prosecutorial discretion, as applied on a case-
by-case basis, would be a more effective tool to advance broad 
executive branch immigration priorities and policies if DHS took 
more specific steps to professionalize the role of the ICE trial 
attorney. 
 
would have no objection to the grant of relief (asylum, cancellation, etc.).” Email from David 
Martin, to Immigration Professor listserv (Sept. 7, 2013) (on file with author).  
 37. See infra Part IV.A.1 (summarizing the criminal prosecutor’s duty to seek justice). 
 38. In 2013, there were 192,736 new filings by DHS for removal orders. TRAC, Number of 
Noncitizens ICE Sought to Remove Who Were Allowed to Remain in U.S. Through August 2014, 
TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_outcome_stay.php 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2014). In 2013, immigration judges granted relief for 90,339 cases (highest 
number since 1998) and granted removal for 82,384 (lowest number since 1998). 
 39. See Agency Information Collection Activities: Consideration of Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals, Form I-821D, New Information Collection, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,451, 49,451–53 
(Aug. 16, 2012) (1,041,300 estimated total number of responses for new Consideration of 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, Form 1-821D, USCIS; 1,761,300 estimated responses 
related to Application for Employment Authorization Document, Form I-765, USCIS; 1,385,292 
responses related to Biometrics; 1,047,357 responses related to Application for Employment 
Authorization Document Worksheet, Form I-765WS, USCIS; and 1,761,300 responses to 
required Passport-Style Photographs). 
 40. Keyes, supra note 34, at 4 (arguing that immigration lawyers must adopt zealous 
advocacy as a guiding principle, as done by criminal defenders in the criminal setting, when 
representing noncitizens because immigrants are also seeking protection from the full weight of 
the state and the stakes in immigration proceedings are extraordinarily high). 
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Part II provides an overview of the history and use of 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, the statutory and judicial 
authority for this power, and the limits of this authority. Part III 
describes the contemporary criticisms of prosecutorial discretion in 
immigration law. Part IV summarizes the use of prosecutorial 
discretion in U.S. criminal law, including the obligation of 
prosecutors to seek justice, and articulates how discretion in criminal 
law ought to inform improvements to the immigration system. In 
Part V, I recommend that DHS professionalize the role of ICE trial 
attorneys within the department and I recommend that there are two 
important tools of criminal prosecutors that should be available to 
ICE trial attorneys—first, the decision to initiate removal 
proceedings should rest solely with an ICE trial attorney, not an 
immigration enforcement officer or administrative hearing officer, 
and that decision, regardless of the outcome, should be articulated in 
writing; and second, ICE should make it a priority to professionalize 
the ICE trial attorney unit by taking specific steps, including 
generating a comprehensive practice manual similar to the U.S. 
Attorney’s Manual that proscribes, in a transparent manner, the 
agency’s practices, policies, and priorities for the use of prosecutorial 
discretion in immigration law. I conclude by arguing that DHS 
should explicitly recognize in its policy guidance and trainings that 
ICE prosecutors have an affirmative obligation to seek justice—not 
just deportation. 
II.  HISTORY, USAGE, LEGAL AUTHORITY, AND LIMITATIONS OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
A.  Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration 
 Is Executive Branch’s Prerogative 
Immigration jurisprudence has historically been fickle about the 
strength and scope of any inherent authority of the executive branch 
to make decisions determining the classes of individuals that may 
enter and remain in the United States.41 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
ruled that immigration, and the right to regulate which individuals 
are allowed to enter the United States, is a power of the sovereign, 
thus signaling that the president has the authority to regulate entry 
 
 41. See Adam Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 458, 482–83 (2009). 
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into the United States.42 Yet, the Court has also stated, “over no other 
area is the legislative power more ‘complete’ than immigration.”43 It 
is Congress that enacts laws determining who can enter the United 
States, under what conditions, and for how long.44 Congress also 
establishes who can be removed from the United States based on acts 
they commit after entry.45 The Court, applying the plenary power 
doctrine, has refused to overturn or invalidate immigration statutes, 
holding that immigration is a matter “vitally and intricately 
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct 
of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of . . . 
government . . . exclusively entrusted to the political branches of 
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference.”46 The Court’s refusal to intervene in congressional 
decisions about who should be allowed to remain in the United 
States signals that immigration decisions are generally exclusively 
legislative,47 unless Congress explicitly delegates authority to the 
executive branch.48 Nonetheless, the executive branch has 
historically exercised prosecutorial discretion in the immigration 
arena by relying on both congressionally delegated power and 
inherent constitutional authority. 
Prior to the passage of the INA in 1920, immigration law was 
primarily viewed as a function of foreign affairs, governed by treaty 
 
 42. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586–88 (1952) (finding a noncitizen 
remaining in the United States is a “matter of permission and tolerance”; it is not a right); see also 
Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 41, at 461 (arguing that the “continued inattention to the scope of 
the President’s power over immigration law has given rise to doctrinal confusion”). 
 43. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 41, at 461 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 
766 (1972)). 
 44. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
LAW AND POLICY 12–24 (5th ed. 2009). 
 45. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
5–6 (2007) (discussing two basic types of deportation laws: “extended border control” and “post-
entry social control”). 
 46. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588–89. 
 47. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 201 (1993) (“Congress . . . 
has plenary power over immigration matters.”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 (1983) 
(“The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art. 1, § 8, cl. 4, is not open to 
question . . . .”); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (“[I]t has long been held that the 
Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who 
possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.”). 
 48. See William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, in LOOKING 
BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 269 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002); Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1725–29 (2002). 
48.1 CORCORAN PAGINATED 4/16/2015  5:28 PM 
Fall 2014] SEEK JUSTICE, NOT DEPORTATION 133 
obligations, and therefore driven by the executive branch.49 
However, after the initial passage of the INA, Congress became more 
engaged in shaping immigration policy and regulation.50 Yet even 
after the passage of the INA, as Professors Cox and Rodríguez 
recount in their article, The President and Immigration Law, there 
were several instances in which the executive branch relied in part on 
its inherent authority to admit individuals into the United States on a 
temporary basis.51 
Most notable was the Bracero Program initiated during World 
War II, which was ultimately operated with congressional consent 
and through a bilateral agreement with Mexico. The Bracero 
Program authorized temporary employment for agricultural workers 
from Mexico, and approximately four to five million Mexican 
workers were employed under this program.52 Ultimately, Congress 
approved the Bracero Program in 1943,53 and in 1951 subsequently 
authorized and extended the program until 1953.54 In instituting the 
Bracero Program, President Franklin D. Roosevelt relied on the 
Ninth Proviso of the Immigration Act of 1917,55 and then shortly 
thereafter, he sought and received explicit congressional approval 
through legislation authorizing the program. In addition to arguing 
for the existence of congressionally delegated authority, the 
administration relied on a bilateral agreement with the Mexican 
government.56 
There are also historic examples in which the executive branch’s 
decision to admit groups of individuals in response to refugee crises 
and mass influx into Florida was grounded in both explicit 
congressionally delegated authority and implicit executive-branch 
authority.57 In particular, the executive branch’s responses to these 
 
 49. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 41, at 483.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 485. 
 52. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 417 (6th ed. 2008). 
 53. Act of Apr. 29, 1943, ch. 82, 57 Stat. 70 (1943). 
 54. Act of July 12, 1951, ch. 223, 65 Stat. 119 (1951). 
 55. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 878; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 41, at 
n.94 (discussing whether or not the Ninth Proviso indeed provided congressional authority to 
admit a large class of immigrants, as well as concluding that the Ninth Proviso was designed to 
provide authority for temporary admission of individual applicants for humanitarian reasons). 
 56. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 41, at 490. 
 57. See id. at 492. 
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mass influxes relied primarily on “the parole power and the power to 
exclude aliens to prevent harm to the United States, both delegated 
by the INA, and inherent executive authority over foreign affairs.”58 
Ultimately, through these executive branch actions, thousands of 
Haitians and Cubans were resettled in the United States.59 In 
addition, many of these fleeing refugees were interdicted on the high 
seas and detained.60 Specifically, the president relied on section 
212(f) of the INA, which provides delegated authority to the 
president to suspend or restrict entry to any noncitizen or class of 
noncitizens if his or her entry could cause harm to the United 
States.61 Additionally, in its role of advising the president, the Office 
of Legal Counsel concluded that the “President’s inherent 
constitutional power to protect the Nation and to conduct foreign 
relations,”62 also provided authority for the president’s interdiction 
program.63 
In these Caribbean crises, the executive branch also relied on the 
parole authority delegated by Congress pursuant to section 212(d)(5) 
of the INA. The parole authority provides that the executive branch 
“may . . . only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian 
reasons or significant public benefit”64 allow a noncitizen who is 
otherwise not eligible for admission to the United States to enter the 
United States on a temporary basis. Typically, this authority is used 
to permit entry into the United States for an individual who needs 
medical attention or to allow for family visitation in compelling 
circumstances.65 However, the executive branch argued that this 
discrete authority also provided a legal basis for paroling thousands 
of the Haitians and Cubans into the United States.66 
Prosecutorial discretion has its historical underpinnings in the 
executive branch’s authority, both implicit and explicit, to determine 
which individuals, who otherwise have no valid immigration status, 
 
 58. Id. at 497. 
 59. Id. at 492. 
 60. Id. at 497–98. 
 61. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012). 
 62. See Proposed Interdiction of Haitian Flag Vessels, 5 Op. O.L.C. 242 (1981). 
 63. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the President’s interdiction program, pursuant to an 
executive order, did not violate the INA, nor Article 33 of the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187 (1993). 
 64. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5A) (2012). 
 65. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 41, at 502. 
 66. See id. at 503. 
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may remain in the United States. Prosecutorial discretion in the 
immigration system includes enforcement discretion,67 as well as 
prosecutorial decisions not to pursue deportation or to “defer action” 
in individual cases.68 Deferred action is a tool used by the executive 
branch to provide discrete relief to certain individuals who have 
compelling personal circumstances that warrant compassion and a 
grant of humanitarian relief.69 This tool has long been recognized as 
a mechanism for DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion.70 
Prosecutorial discretion, including deferred action, is exercised 
either for humanitarian reasons or because limited resources preclude 
prosecution of every individual who lacks valid immigration status. 
Moreover, the INA has expanded the types of acts that render a 
noncitizen deportable.71 Often times, expansion occurs in direct 
response to either actual or perceived threats posed by an individual 
immigrant or groups of immigrants.72 Yet, these expansions of 
deportable acts often result in overreach and unintentional preclusion 
of some individuals from admission to the United States.73 
 
 67. Reno v. Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 68. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 69. This authority is similar to parole authority and the authority in the Ninth Proviso of the 
Immigration Act of 1917. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5A), 8 U.S.C 
§ 1182(d)(5A) (providing that the Attorney General may “only on a case-by-case basis” parole 
noncitizens into the United States for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”); 
see also Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 41, at n.94 (explaining that the Ninth Proviso was 
“designed principally for the temporary admission of individual applicants for whom ‘urgent 
necessity or . . . unusual grave hardship would result from a denial of their request’”). 
 70. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2013); Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 15, at 
244. 
 71. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 4, at 1. 
 72. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, E Pluribus Unum: Immigration, Race, and Other Deep 
Divides, 21 S. ILL. UNIV. L. REV. 101 (1996); Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of 
Exclusions to African Americans, 37 HOWARD L.J. 237 (1994). 
 73. In 2005 Congress passed the REAL ID Act, a post 9-11 antiterrorism legislation, which 
among many things expanded the definition of material support of terrorism. REAL ID Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B § 1, 119 Stat. 231, 303–23 (2005). Any noncitizen that 
provided material support to terrorism is barred admission into the United States. While sensible 
on its face, REAL ID had unintended foreign policy consequences. For example, caught up in this 
expansion were Chins, who are an ethnic and religious minority in Burma that were targeted by 
the military junta ruling at the time. After the passage of REAL ID, ethnic Chins fleeing known 
persecution were denied asylum by immigration judges because they had provided food to 
members of the Chin National Front, which was an armed force resisting the illegitimate military 
junta in Burma. See generally Michele L. Lombardo et al., Terrorism, Material Support, the 
Inherent Right to Self-Defense, and the U.S. Obligation to Protect Legitimate Asylum Seekers in a 
Post-9/11, Post-Patriot Act, Post-REAL ID Act World, 4 REGENT J. INT’L L. 261 (2006) 
(discussing the implications of the REAL ID Act on asylum seekers in the United States and 
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It was not until the 1970s, however, that the public became 
aware of the Nonpriority Program long utilized by the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS).74 The Nonpriority Program was 
initiated to “defer action in deportation cases in situations in which, 
because of humanitarian reasons, expulsion of aliens would not be 
appropriate.”75 In determining who might qualify for deferred action, 
INS gave consideration to age, length of presence in the United 
States, the need for physical or mental treatment that might only be 
available in the United States, the potential effect of deportation on 
the immigrant’s family status, and whether the immigrant had 
engaged in any criminal or immoral conduct.76 
In 1975, pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request, John 
Lennon made public the Operations Instructions. The Instructions 
outlined the Nonpriority Program, and received public attention 
when Lennon attempted to invoke Nonpriority status as a remedy 
against his pending deportation.77 When the INS was required to 
release information about the Nonpriority Program, it “steadfastly 
maintained that Nonpriority status was merely an intra-agency 
guideline, which conferred no substantive rights”; that is, it was 
essentially an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.78 
B.  Legal Authority for Prosecutorial  
Discretion in Immigration 
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States79 
upheld the use of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, noting 
 
arguing that the expanded definition of material support, as applied, violates the U.S. 
international obligations to protect refugees fleeing persecution). 
 74. See Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service: Internal 
Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 101 (1979). 
 75. Id. at 100. 
 76. See Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 806–07 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice, Operations Instructions, Regulations, 
and Interpretations, 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1952, as revised 1979)) (“In every case where the district 
director determines that adverse action would be unconscionable because of the existence of 
appealing humanitarian factors, he shall recommend consideration for deferred action category.”); 
see also Wildes, supra note 74, at 100–101 n.5 (“When determining whether a case should be 
recommended for nonpriority category, consideration should include the following: (1) Advanced 
or tender age; (2) Many years’ presence in the United States; (3) Physical or mental condition 
requiring care or treatment in the States; (4) Family situation in the United States—the effect of 
expulsion; (5) Criminal, Immoral, or Subversive activities or affiliations— recent conduct.”) 
 77. Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 78. Wildes, supra note 74, at 101. 
 79. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
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that “[a] principal feature of the removal system is the broad 
authority entrusted to immigration officials” and that “[r]eturning an 
alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he 
has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for 
admission.”80 The use of prosecutorial discretion in these instances 
may reflect “immediate human concerns” and the “equities of  . . . 
individual case[s],” including ties to the community, children 
possessing U.S. citizenship and “policy choices that bear on . . . 
international relations.”81 This rationale builds on the Court’s 
reasoning in Matthews v. Diaz,82 that  
the relationship between the U.S. and our alien visitors has 
been committed to the political branches of the federal 
government. Since decisions in these matters may implicate 
our relations with foreign powers . . . such decisions are 
frequently of a character more appropriate to either the 
Legislature or Executive branches than to the Judiciary.83 
In addition, the Supreme Court has declined to invalidate the 
government’s decision to commence removal against individuals 
who are without valid immigrant status and for whom the 
government may have targeted for investigation based on 
constitutionally protected grounds, such as membership in a political 
group.84 In Reno v. AADC,85 the Supreme Court held that the INS 
“may constitutionally single out aliens for investigation and 
deportation based on their membership in disfavored political 
groups, as long as it offers as a pretext some other technical basis for 
deportation.”86 Therefore, while the courts will in narrow 
circumstances review prosecutorial discretion decisions made by 
criminal prosecutors based on impermissible grounds such as 
selective prosecution,87 this type of prosecutorial misconduct in 
immigration is not subject to judicial review or sanction.88 
 
 80. Id. at 2495, 2499. 
 81. Id. at 2499. 
 82. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 83. Id. at 81. 
 84. Reno v. Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 85. Id. 
 86. David Cole, Damage Control? A Comment on Professor Neuman’s Reading of Reno v. 
AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 347, 347–48 (2000). 
 87. See U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that in order to file selective-
prosecution claims based on race, defendants must show that the government failed to prosecute 
similarly situated suspects of other races). Selective prosecution is the exception to the rule due to 
48.1 CORCORAN PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2015  5:28 PM 
138 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.48:119 
C.  Modern Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion  
in Immigration Context 
Generally, the courts have upheld the use prosecutorial 
discretion in immigration law as a discretionary choice. The first part 
of this section provides an overview of this jurisprudence. The 
second part of this section details the various interagency guidance 
documents that offer examples to immigration officials for which 
discretion is appropriate, and also serve as the basis legal basis for 
the recent DACA program.  
1.  The Decision Not to Deport Is a  
Discretionary Administrative Choice 
Following Lennon’s public disclosure of the Nonpriority status, 
courts began to scrutinize the bounds and application of the INS’s 
discretionary program. In the 1976 case Soon Bok Yoon v. INS,89 the 
Fifth Circuit held that the “decision to grant or withhold Nonpriority 
status . . . lies within the particular discretion of the INS,” and 
“decline[d] to hold that the [INS] has no power to create and employ 
such a category for its own administrative convenience.”90 The Yoon 
court also noted that an immigration judge had no obligation to 
notify an immigrant in deportation proceedings of the possibility of 
Nonpriority status.91 In spite of the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, 
however, the Eighth Circuit saw fit to delay two deportation cases to 
allow the immigrants to apply for Nonpriority status.92 These cases 
highlight the circuits’ varying treatments of the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, culminating in the Ninth Circuit’s 1979 
decision Nicholas v. INS.93 Nicholas was significant for its holding 
that the Nonpriority Program was not merely an administrative 
convenience but rather was a “substantive provision.”94 Defined as 
such, courts were allowed to analyze and interpret the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and review whether the benefit was properly 
 
the fact that courts will generally not review a prosecutor’s discretionary decisions. See Newman 
v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting that the executive branch’s decision 
on whether to institute criminal proceedings and what to charge is immune from judicial review). 
 88. Reno, 525 U.S. at 471. 
 89. Soon Bok Yoon v. INS, 538 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 90. Id. at 1213. 
 91. Id. at 1212–13. 
 92. David v. INS, 548 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1977); Vergel v. INS, 536 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 93. 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 94. Id. 
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withheld or conferred.95 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling ran contrary to 
the INS’s position that the Nonpriority Program was only an “intra-
agency guideline.” 
To cement the INS’s position regarding its prosecutorial 
discretion, in the wake of the Nicholas decision, the Operations 
Instructions were revised “to affirmatively state that grants of 
deferred action status were an administrative choice by the agency 
and in no way an ‘entitlement’ to the noncitizen.”96 The next 
significant alteration to the Operations Instructions came in 1996, 
following passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA): 
The IIRAIRA eliminated both the possibility of relief from 
deportation and the possibility of bond for many criminal 
and other aliens placed in deportation and/or removal 
proceedings who previously would have been eligible for 
relief. Consequently, the IIRAIRA rendered the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion by the INS the only means for 
averting the extreme hardship associated with certain 
deportation and/or removal cases.97 
Since the passage of IIRAIRA, the INS (ultimately DHS, following 
restructuring in 2002)98 has issued a number of internal memoranda 
addressing guidelines and application of prosecutorial discretion.99 
2.  Prosecutorial Discretion Is Rooted in  
Internal Agency Guidance 
One of the first comprehensive reviews of prosecutorial 
discretion came in 2000, when Bo Cooper, INS general counsel, 
wrote a memorandum outlining its use in the INS.100 This document 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 15, at 250 (citing Leon Wildes, The 
Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: A Possible 
Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819 (2004)). 
 97. Id. at 252–53 (citing a Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to Rep. 
Barney Frank, U.S. H.R., on Use of Prosecutorial Discretion to Avoid Harsh Consequences of 
IIRAIRA (Jan. 19, 2000)). 
 98. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
 99. KATE M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42924, 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL ISSUES (2013). 
 100. See Memorandum from Bo Cooper, Gen. Counsel on INS Use of Professional Discretion 
to the Comm’r (2000) [hereinafter Memorandum from Bo Cooper], available at 
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Bo-Cooper-memo.pdf. 
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was “intended to be the first step in the INS’ examination of its use 
of prosecutorial discretion.”101 The memorandum reviewed the 
history of prosecutorial discretion and its application in the 
immigration context, noting that “the administrative enforcement 
discretion generally deferred to by courts extends far more broadly to 
a wide variety of INS decisions than the strictly ‘prosecutorial’ 
decision to institute removal proceedings.”102 In exploring the limits 
on prosecutorial discretion, the memorandum stated: 
First, in order to be a nonreviewable exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, the decision must be a decision to 
enforce, or not to enforce, the law. An enforcement decision 
must be distinguished from an affirmative act of approval, 
or grant of a benefit, under a statute or other applicable law 
that sets guidelines for determining when the approval 
should be given. [Heckler v.] Chaney, 470 U.S. [821, 831 
(1985)]. An enforcement decision is an exercise—or 
nonexercise—of an agency’s coercive power over an 
individual’s liberty or property. Id. at 832. The doctrine of 
prosecutorial discretion applies to enforcement decisions, 
not benefit decisions.103 
It was further noted that certain INS decisions that might be 
classified as exercises of prosecutorial discretion could be reviewed 
for abuse of discretion, subject to constitutional considerations, and 
potentially limited by statutes passed by Congress.104 Cooper’s 
conclusion was that: 
The INS has broad prosecutorial discretion in its law 
enforcement activities, although that discretion is not 
unlimited. This authority includes the prosecutorial 
discretion not to place a removable alien in proceedings, but 
the INS does not have prosecutorial discretion to admit an 
inadmissible alien into the United States. The INS does not 
have prosecutorial discretion to provide any benefit under 
the INA to an alien who is not eligible to receive it.105 
 
 101. Id. at 1. 
 102. Id. at 3. 
 103. Id. at 4. 
 104. See id. at 4–9. 
 105. Id. at 12. 
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Cooper’s memorandum was one of the first to fully explore the legal 
basis for the INS’s use of prosecutorial discretion, and served as a 
foundation for continued discussion of the topic. 
In November 2000, INS commissioner Doris Meissner issued 
her own memorandum to directors and counsel regarding the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Building on much of the 
background in the Cooper memorandum, Commissioner Meissner 
directed: 
Service officers are not only authorized by law but expected 
to exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all stages of 
the enforcement process—from planning investigations to 
enforcing final orders—subject to their chains of command 
and to the particular responsibilities and authority 
applicable to their specific position. In exercising this 
discretion, officers must take into account the principles 
described below [in the memorandum] in order to promote 
the efficient and effective enforcement of the immigration 
laws and the interests of justice.106 
This memorandum outlined a number of factors to be considered in 
the favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion at any stage of a 
case, including: immigration status, length of residence in the United 
States, criminal history, humanitarian concerns, immigration history, 
likelihood of ultimate removal, likelihood of using other means, 
effect on the community, cooperation with law enforcement, 
honorable United States military service, community attention, and 
availability of INS resources.107 These categories were consistent 
with the original Nonpriority Program used by the INS in the 1970s 
and before. In addition to outlining the legal basis for prosecutorial 
discretion, Meissner’s memorandum offered more practical 
guidelines to those who would be exercising this discretion in the 
immigration context. 
After the INS was restructured into ICE, CBP, and the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in 2002,108 William J. 
Howard, principal legal advisor, issued a memorandum to chief 
counsel regarding the continued use of prosecutorial discretion 
 
 106. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 4, at 1 
 107. Id. at 7–8. 
 108. See Homeland Security Act, 116 Stat. 2135–36. 
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across the several immigration branches of the DHS.109 In particular, 
Howard highlighted that the volume of immigration cases coming 
through ICE, CBP, and USCIS was extreme, and that “[l]itigating 
with maximum efficiency requires that we exercise careful yet quick 
judgments on questions involving prosecutorial discretion.”110 
Howard stressed the need for the Office of Principal Legal Advisor 
(OPLA) attorneys to not only become familiar with the principles of 
prosecutorial discretion but also identify certain situations in which 
the favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion would be advised; 
for example, when to exercise that discretion instead of seeking an 
alien’s removal, or when not to pursue an appeal.111 In 2007, the 
issue was revisited in a memorandum by Assistant Secretary Julie 
Meyers, specifically addressing the need for field agents to “use 
discretion in identifying and responding to meritorious health related 
cases and caregiver issues” by exercising discretion, when 
appropriate, against taking nursing mothers into custody.112 
ICE revisited the general precepts of prosecutorial discretion and 
its favorable exercise again in 2011.113 Citing various prior internal 
treatises on the subject, Director John Morton noted the limitations 
on ICE’s resources and the potential for maximizing those resources 
through the use of prosecutorial discretion. Noting that prosecutorial 
discretion could be used at many stages of an investigation, Morton 
outlined several situations in which a favorable exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion would be a preferred outcome. The 
memorandum also included a “not exhaustive” list of factors to 
consider in favorably exercising prosecutorial discretion; this list was 
considerably longer and more detailed than the general categories of 
factors in Meissner’s 2000 memorandum.114 For example, pregnant 
 
 109. See Memorandum from William J. Howard, supra note 29. 
 110. Id. at 2. 
 111. Id. at 1, 6–7. 
 112. See Memorandum from Julie L. Meyers, Assistant Sec’y for Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion, to All Field 
Office Directors and Special Agents in Charge, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Nov. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Memorandum from Julie L. Myers], 
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/custody-pd.pdf. 
 113. See Memorandum from John Morton on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 
18, at 4.  
 114. Compare Memorandum from John Morton on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra 
note 18, at 4 (outlining nineteen detailed factors to consider in the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, including “the agency’s civil immigration enforcement priorities,” and “whether the 
person is currently cooperating or has cooperated with federal, state or local law enforcement 
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and nursing women; victims of domestic violence, trafficking, or 
other serious crimes; and individuals present in the United States 
since childhood were included as individuals who should be given 
prompt particular care and consideration.115 In addition, the 
memorandum identified negative factors that should also prompt 
particular care and consideration, including individuals who: (1) pose 
a national security threat; (2) have serious or lengthy criminal 
histories; (3) are known gang members; (4) pose a clear danger to 
public safety; (5) have an “egregious record of immigration 
violations, including . . . a record of illegal re-entry”;116 and (6) 
“have engaged in immigration fraud.”117 Ultimately, Morton’s 
treatment of the subject reinforced the position that DHS’s 
immigration branches should continue to use prosecutorial 
discretion, when appropriate, as a necessary tool for handling 
immigration cases. 
Many of the INS and DHS memoranda about prosecutorial 
discretion address its general use, set forth the legal grounds for its 
exercise, and emphasize the need for prosecutorial discretion as a 
tool to efficiently handle immigration cases. In 2012, a memorandum 
regarding prosecutorial discretion issued by Secretary of Homeland 
Security Janet Napolitano called for the use of prosecutorial 
discretion in a specific context.118 Building on the rights of ICE, 
CBP, and USCIS to exercise prosecutorial discretion generally, 
Napolitano’s memorandum set forth particular criteria by which a 
certain class of individuals should benefit from a favorable exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion. 
Yet, in all these memoranda prosecutorial discretion is 
understood as a tool—the same tool—for agents, investigators, 
adjudicators, and prosecutors. There are no distinct roles or protocols 
for the various, distinct actors in the immigration system. The criteria 
to grant a favorable exercise of discretion and not apprehend an 
individual are the same for the decision on whether or not to initiate 
removal proceedings against an immigrant. ICE trial attorneys are 
 
authorities”), with Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 4, at 7–8 (outlining thirteen 
broad factors, including immigration status, criminal history, and availability of INS resources). 
 115. See Memorandum from John Morton on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 
18, at 5. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 18, at 1. 
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not seen as administrators of justice, with unique ethical duties 
inherent in the role of a criminal prosecutor; rather, they are 
enforcers—simply another extension of immigration police power. 
III.  CRITICS CITE UNDERUSE AND OVERBROAD APPLICATION AS 
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS TO PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
A.  Discretion Underutilized: Structural Critiques of  
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law 
One of the main critiques of prosecutorial discretion in the 
immigration context is that it is not used consistently119 or enough.120 
Advocates point to compelling cases in which ICE attorneys refused 
to consider the individual circumstances and the impact of removal 
on the family and community.121 A related concern is that while there 
is guidance to the field from DHS national headquarters on how to 
use prosecutorial discretion, at the local level its usage varies 
significantly.122 Therefore, an immigrant’s ability to avail herself of 
this relief is more dependent on the jurisdiction she resides in than 
the merits of her individual situation.123 
 
 119. Data from an August 31, 2014, study shows the variance by immigration court location 
in the use of prosecutorial discretion to “close” cases. For example, 28.1 percent of cases closed 
in Seattle, Washington were a result of prosecutorial discretion (of the 7,373 cases closed, 2,075 
were pursuant to prosecutorial discretion). In comparison, in San Antonio prosecutorial discretion 
accounted for 3.9 percent of case closures (of the 10,662 cases closed, 418 were closed with 
prosecutorial discretion). TRAC, Immigration Court Cases Closed Based on Prosecutorial 
Discretion, TRAC IMMIGR. (Aug. 31, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/prosdiscretion 
/compbacklog_latest.html. 
 120. Data from the same August 31, 2014, study indicates that only 6.8 percent of cases 
before immigration courts were closed through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Id. 
Contrast this figure with criminal law, where prosecutors use their prosecutorial discretion to plea 
and charge bargain in about 90 percent to 95 percent of cases. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 59 (2004); see also 
Sharing Secrets, supra note 13, at 28 (discussing the American Bar Association’s testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 17, 2011, where the ABA stated “[p]rioritization, 
including the prudent use of prosecutorial discretion, is an essential function of any adjudication 
system. Unfortunately, it has not been widely utilized in the immigration context.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 121. Sharing Secrets, supra note 13, at 40–44. 
 122. See TRAC, supra note 119. 
 123. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007) (concluding that one of the strongest variables in 
determining the outcome of an asylum claim was not nationality of applicant or type of claim, 
rather it is what immigration district in the United States the applicant applied in). 
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Another recurring criticism about immigration officers in 
relation to the exercise of discretion is the lack of transparency about 
how these decisions are made.124 Advocates argue that without 
knowing the criteria for when an immigration officer or attorney 
decides to exercise prosecutorial discretion, they have no guarantee 
that the decisions being made are not arbitrary. Publicly available 
guidance is needed so that attorneys know what is required to prevail 
on a request to not pursue action that could result in the removal of 
their client. In addition, if DHS departs from this guidance, the 
immigrant placed in removal proceedings should be able to pursue 
judicial recourse as a remedy.125 
Similarly, a common critique about deferred action—one 
example of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law—exists. In 
fact, in a recent article, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Immigration Law, Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia argues that 
the deferred action authority, which is derived from the INS 
operating instruction, is a substantive, not procedural rule and should 
be subject to informal rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).126 Professor Wadhia contends that deferred 
action generally is quasi-legislative, should be codified into 
regulations, and should ultimately be subjected to judicial review like 
any other legislative rule.127 Her solution appears to conclude that 
deferred action is distinct from prosecutorial discretion generally and 
should be treated like a legislative or binding rule.128 
 
 124. See Sharing Secrets, supra note 13, at 48–51 (discussing the lack of transparency in 
decision-making process by immigration officials on whether to grant deferred action to an 
individual). 
 125. See id. at 56. 
 126. See Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 15, at 282–86 (arguing for clear 
administrative guidelines for deferred action, including publicly available criteria that is subject to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to section 553 of the APA). 
 127. See Sharing Secrets, supra note 13, at 61–63. 
 128. While Professor Wadhia has argued that deferred action should be subject to the rules of 
administrative law, pursuant to section 553 of the APA and judicial review under section 706 of 
the APA, she also posits that President Obama’s DACA initiative, granting deferred action for a 
subset of individuals, is a legitimate act of prosecutorial discretion and is well within his 
executive branch powers and is therefore immune from judicial review and congressional 
intervention. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the 
DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 59 (2012). In Professor Wadhia’s most recent article, she 
disagrees with DHS’s view that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion does not confer any legal 
right, or enforceable benefit, shielding it from judicial review. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The 
Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge: Examining the Role of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial 
Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39 (2013) [hereinafter The Immigration 
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Professor Michael Asimow, in his article Nonlegislative 
Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, summarizes the difference 
between legislative and nonlegislative rules: 
The theoretical difference between legislative and 
nonlegislative rules is clear. A legislative rule is essentially 
an administrative statute—an exercise of previously 
delegated power, new law that completes an incomplete 
legislative design. Legislative rules frequently prescribe, 
modify, or abolish duties, rights, or exemptions. In contrast, 
nonlegislative rules do not exercise delegated lawmaking 
power and thus are not administrative statutes. Instead, they 
provide guidance to the public and to agency staff and 
decisionmakers. They are not legally binding on members 
of the public. 
 Interpretive rules and policy statements serve distinct 
functions. An interpretative rule clarifies or explains the 
meaning of words used in a statute, a previous agency rule, 
or a judicial or agency adjudicative decision. A policy 
statement, on the other hand, indicates how an agency 
 
Prosecutor and Judge]. Notably, courts have held that deferred action is a general statement of 
policy and therefore not subject to APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. In these cases, 
courts have held that the decision to grant, or refuse, deferred action to an otherwise removable 
immigrant is a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion and therefore also not subject to judicial 
review. Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d 1150, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that INA § 242(g) 
precludes the Court from reviewing claim on behalf of a noncitizen challenging any decision by 
the attorney general to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders). In 
addition, in Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court held that prosecutorial discretion is an 
inherent executive branch function and that exercises of prosecutorial discretion are agency 
actions “committed to agency discretion” and exempt from judicial review under § 701(a)(2) of 
the APA. 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). Professor Wadhia counters and argues that individuals 
should be able to challenge “prosecutorial denials” when an agency takes an enforcement action 
against an individual pursuant to § 706 of the APA because the agency action is “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.” See The Immigration 
Prosecutor and the Judge, supra note 128, at 55–58. This line of argument assumes that a person 
who is not in valid immigration status has a legal right, or basis, in the law to not have charges 
brought against them because the agency has the authority to not prosecute violations of the INA. 
Professor Wadhia cites to dicta in Heckler, where the Supreme Court makes a distinction between 
the courts’ role when an agency decides to not enforce versus taking enforcement action. The 
Court reasoned that there is a role for a court to review what process agency provided when an 
individual’s liberty or property interests are implicated. Id. at 58 (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 
832). I would argue the role a court has when an agency does take action is to review the 
procedure the agency provided and to make sure an individual’s constitutional due process rights 
were met. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that review of 
agency decisions involves consideration the specific due process and procedural protections the 
situation requires). 
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hopes or intends to exercise discretionary power in the 
course of performing some other administrative function.129 
However, prosecutorial discretion, as outlined by former INS 
commissioners and other DHS officials, looks much more like policy 
statements about enforcement priorities than an effort to fill missing 
gaps in the INA. The only way deferred action should be subject to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking would be if it is understood to be a 
modification or exemption to the INA. If that were the case, deferred 
action would either be an immigration benefit or approval, and 
therefore not a function of prosecutorial discretion.130 Yet, deferred 
action is an essential component of prosecutorial discretion in 
immigration law, and the more politically palatable solution to 
increasing its use on a case-by-case basis is to modify the role of ICE 
trial attorneys to be more similar to that of criminal prosecutors. 
Certainly judicial review should be available131 when ICE trial 
attorneys act egregiously and are motivated by impermissible reasons 
in denying a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion. However, 
if prosecutorial discretion is to remain a solidly executive branch 
prerogative to counter legislation painted with too broad a brush (a 
defect of almost all legislation) and a mechanism to prioritize 
individuals for deportation, such as violent repeat criminal offenders, 
it generally should be shielded from judicial review. What is 
necessary is not judicial intervention but internal and cultural 
changes at the ICE trial attorney office that will professionalize the 
role of the immigration prosecutors and demand higher ethical 
standards akin to that of U.S. federal prosecutors.132 
 
 129. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 
381, 383 (1985). 
 130. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 4, at 3 (“Prosecutorial discretion 
does not apply to affirmative acts of approval, or grants of benefits, under a statute or other 
applicable law that provides requirements for determining when approval should be given.”). 
 131. This may be an aspirational goal given the Court’s ruling in Reno v. Am-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999). The majority held that the INS “may 
constitutionally single out aliens for investigation and deportation based on their membership in 
disfavored political groups, as long as it offers as a pretext some other technical basis for 
deportation.” Cole, supra note 86, at 347–48. Therefore, where the courts will in narrow 
circumstances review prosecutorial discretion decisions made on impermissible grounds 
including selective prosecution, this type of prosecutorial misconduct in immigration is not 
subject to judicial review or sanction. See U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (holding 
that in order to file selective-prosecution claims based on race, defendants must show that the 
government failed to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races).  
 132. See infra Part V. 
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B.  Recent Challenges to Executive Branch’s  
Application of Prosecutorial Discretion to  
Classes of Individuals 
When the president announced his DACA directive as a valid 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, critics countered that DACA is 
decidedly different from the historical use of prosecutorial discretion, 
in both the immigration and criminal law contexts; DACA departs 
from the prosecutorial discretion framework by exercising discretion 
on a case-by-case basis.133 It is this departure from precedent that 
critics argue makes the DACA directive constitutionally suspect. 
Specifically, Congress has not delegated to the president open-ended 
immigration authority for immunizing large classes of individuals 
from removal, nor does the president have inherent authority for this 
action. The president and immigration advocates134 assert that his 
decision to grant deferred action to a class of 1.7 million135 
individuals is an example of a well-established “back end” authority 
of prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-case basis.136 Individually 
assessed DREAMers meet the DHS criteria for a favorable exercise 
 
 133. See Margulies, supra note 19, at 111–19 (arguing that prosecutorial discretion cannot 
support the DACA directive).  
 134. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 18; Letter from Immigration Law 
Professors to President Obama, Executive Authority to Grant Administrative Relief to DREAM 
Act Beneficiaries (May 28, 2012) (on file with author), available at http://lawprofessors 
.typepad.com/files/executiveauthorityfordreamrelief28may2012withsignatures.pdf; Letter to 
Interested Parties from Cheryl Little, Exec. Dir., Americans for Immigrant Justice, to Interested 
Parties (May 18, 2012) (on file with author). 
 135. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Agency Information Collection 
Activities: Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, Form 1-821D, New 
Information Collection; Emergency Submission to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Comment Request, 77 Fed. Reg. 49451 (Aug. 16, 2012) (1,041,300 estimated total number of 
responses for new Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, Form 1-821D, 
USCIS); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Agency Information Collection Activities: 
Application for Employment Authorization, Form 1-765, Revision of a Currently Approved 
Information Collection; Emergency Submission to the Office of Management and Budget; 
Comment Request, 77 Fed. Reg. 49453 (Aug. 16, 2012) (1,761,300 estimated responses related to 
Application for Employment Authorization Document, Form I-765, USCIS; 1,385,292 responses 
related to Biometrics; 1,047,357 responses related to Application for Employment Authorization 
Document Worksheet, Form I-765WS, USCIS; and 1,761,300 responses to required Passport-
Style Photographs). 
 136. Professors Adam Cox and Cristina M. Rodríguez make a compelling argument that 
“[t]he President’s power to decide which and how many noncitizens should live in the United 
States operates principally at the back end of the system, through the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion with respect to whom to deport, rather than at the front end of the system, through 
decisions about whom to admit.” Cox &. Rodríguez, supra note 41, at 464. 
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of prosecutorial discretion.137 Specifically, they are in “pursuit of 
education in the United States” and “have graduated from a U.S. 
high school or have successfully pursued or are pursuing a college or 
advanced degree at a legitimate institution of higher education in the 
United States.”138 In addition to these specific criteria, DREAMers 
also have other general equities that DHS considers when deciding 
whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion. They are not criminals, 
they are not an enforcement priority, they do not have any criminal 
history, and they have strong family and community ties.139 
This section outlines the arguments that have surfaced around 
the president’s directive and organized the section into the types of 
individuals leveling their criticism. First, the section summarizes 
some of the prominent legal academics’ arguments around the 
constitutionality of the initiative. Second, it discusses reactions of 
members of Congress to the president’s initiative. The section 
concludes with a summary of the litigation brought by DHS border 
patrol agents challenging the initiative’s application. 
1.  The Legal Academy 
One line of argument against the president’s DACA directive is 
that it is not based in any express or delegated statutory authority. 
For example, Professor Peter Margulies argues in his recent article 
Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, “the INA is 
comprehensive legislation, in scope resembling the provisions of the 
labor management legislation the Court cited in Youngstown 
itself.”140 Congress has created a complex framework in which, 
under various conditions, noncitizens can be granted affirmative 
relief even if they are in the United States without valid immigration 
status.141 Congress also has created broad categories defining who is 
ineligible for immigration relief and lacks a legal basis to remain in 
 
 137. See Memorandum from John Morton on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 
18, at 4. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Margulies, supra note 19, at 122 (arguing that prosecutorial discretion cannot 
support the DACA directive). 
 141. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(2) (2012) (victims of 
domestic violence); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (refugees). 
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the United States.142 The president cannot sidestep or override this 
comprehensive statutory structure by granting broad relief to 1.7 
million immigrants residing in the United States without any valid 
immigration status, because the action supersedes any delegated 
authority to the executive branch.143 In the INA, Congress explicitly 
authorized the president to provide temporary relief in emergency 
circumstances on a case-by-case basis for individuals fleeing war or 
natural disaster.144 Professor Margulies, however, does not think the 
president is without authority to grant this relief; rather the power to 
do so is not grounded in the authority Congress has delegated to him. 
Instead, Professor Margulies posits that the stewardship argument 
provides the necessary authority to insulate the president from 
constitutionality attacks.145 
Others critics of the president’s broad DACA directive have 
argued that the president’s action is outside of the scope of 
prosecutorial discretion afforded to immigration cases. For example, 
in concluding that the president had violated the Take Care Clause of 
the Constitution, Professors Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, in 
their recent article Dream On: The Obama’s Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the 
Take Care Clause, argue “the Obama Administration has provided 
no adequate excuse or justification for its nonenforcement 
decision.”146 The authors conclude that the president’s directive 
violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution,147 which imposes 
a duty for the president to take due care while enforcing the laws. 
2.  The Legislative Branch 
In response, both House and Senate Republicans sent letters to 
DHS and President Obama questioning the legal authority to 
proscribe this new directive.148 In these letters, members of Congress 
 
 142. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 143. See Margulies, supra note 19, at 126. 
 144. Id. at 120. 
 145. Id. at 128–29. 
 146. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 16, at 785 (2013) (providing an argument for DACA 
violating the Take Care Clause). 
 147. Id. at 784–85. 
 148. See Letter from Lamar Smith to John Morton, supra note 20. But see Letter from Senator 
Harry Reid et al. to President Barack Obama (Apr. 13, 2011), available at 
http://wwwscribd.como/doc/53014785/22-Senators-Ltr-Obama-Relief-For-DREAMers-4 
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argued that the new directive was unconstitutional because it usurped 
legislative authority, violated the president’s duty under the Take 
Care Clause,149 and violated administrative law. In addition, the 
House of Representatives, using the “power of the purse,”150 passed a 
bill that stated, “None of the funds made available in this Act may be 
used to finalize, implement, administer, or enforce the ‘Morton 
Memos.’”151 The Morton Memos, which are described in detail 
below, were issued by the assistant secretary of ICE to all agents, 
officers, and attorneys at ICE. These memoranda described ICE’s 
authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, as well as factors that 
should be considered in making that assessment. 
3.  The Judiciary 
In a recent federal lawsuit, several ICE officers and the state of 
Mississippi challenged the DACA directive.152 In the complaint, the 
plaintiffs argue that the directive 
commands ICE officers to violate their oaths to uphold and 
support federal law, violates the Administrative Procedure 
Act, unconstitutionally usurps and encroaches upon the 
legislative powers of Congress, as defined in Article I of the 
United States Constitution, and violates the obligation of 
the executive branch to faithfully execute the law, as 
required by Article II, Section 3, of the United States 
Constitution.153 
While it ultimately deferred ruling on a petition for preliminary 
injunction, on April 23, 2013, the district court did find that Plaintiffs 
had a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits.154 In its 
order, the court did not address the two constitutional arguments 
advanced by the plaintiffs: (1) the executive branch usurpation of 
 
(members of the Senate arguing that the President does have the authority to grant deferred action 
to this class of individuals and urging the President to exercise such authority). 
 149. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 150. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”). 
 151. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, H.R. 5855, 112th Cong. 
§ 581 (as passed by the House, June 7, 2012). 
 152. Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 
2012) (No. 12-CV-03247-O). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, 2013 WL 1744422, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 
April 23, 2013). 
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legislative powers, and (2) the violation of the Take Care Clause.155 
The court did, however, discuss the statutory arguments. The 
plaintiffs contended that when an agent of the executive branch 
encounters an unauthorized immigrant, that agent has no discretion 
to place the unauthorized immigrant in removal proceedings.156 The 
crux of this argument concerns the question of whether 8 U.S.C 
§ 1225 (INA § 235), as amended by the IIRAIRA,157 allows for 
prosecutorial discretion before an immigrant is placed in removal 
proceedings.158 
The plaintiffs argued that three provisos within 8 U.S.C. § 1225 
require immigration officers to arrest and detain any individual they 
come in contact with that is “an applicant for admission.” The 
plaintiffs further contended that immigration officers have no 
discretion to decide whether or not to place the individual in removal 
proceedings. The complaint argues: 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) requires that “an alien present in the 
United States who has not been admitted  . . . shall be 
deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for 
admission.” This designation triggers 8 U.S.C. § 1225 
(a)(3), which requires that all applicants for admission 
“shall be inspected by immigration officers.” This in turn 
triggers 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2)(A), which mandates that “if 
the examining immigration officer determines that an alien 
seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled 
to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a [removal] 
proceeding [in immigration court].”159 
Recently, the court dismissed this case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, holding that the Collective Bargaining Agreement and 
Civil Reform Act provides a comprehensive and exclusive scheme 
 
 155. Id.; see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 16 (providing an argument for DACA 
violating the Take Care Clause). But see Wadhia, supra note 128 (addressing Professors 
Delahunty and Yoo’s arguments, and countering with an explanation as to why DACA is 
constitutional). 
 156. Amended Complaint at 15–16, Crane, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724 (No. 12-cv-03427-O). 
 157. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
 158. See David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and 
Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 (2012), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-defense-of-immigration-enforcement-discretion-the-legal 
-and-policy-flaws-in-kris-kobachs-latest-crusade. 
 159. Amended Complaint, supra note 156, at 15. 
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for resolving disputes brought by federal employees.160 Therefore, 
the ICE agents were precluded from seeking relief in federal district 
court. In its order, the court opined that there was merit to the 
underlying claim, despite the court’s lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.161 While this case was dismissed on procedural grounds, 
the question still remains: Does the INA legally mandate that 
immigration enforcement officers must place a removable noncitizen 
in removal proceedings or does it provide discretion? If this issue 
finally discovers a proper vehicle for judicial resolution, a court may 
find a valid, but nonconstitutional, grounds for enjoining the DACA 
directive.162 If this type of claim were to prevail, a likely resolution 
would be no discretion in an arrest, decision to detain, or issuance of 
a Notice to Appear (NTA). 
Professor David Martin, former INS general counsel, in his most 
recent article A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The 
Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, provides a 
compelling argument for why the plaintiffs misinterpreted the statute 
on its face, as well as ignored the legislative history of INA § 235. In 
1996, Congress added a new provision to § 235 of the INA, 
§ 235(a)(1), which applies to all persons present in the United States 
who were not inspected or admitted as applicants for admission.163 
Professor Martin points out that prior to 1996, immigrants physically 
residing in the United States who had not entered lawfully and were 
not inspected at a point of entry, were considered as entering the 
United States and subject to deportation proceedings instead of 
exclusion proceedings.164 This distinction was crucial because an 
immigrant in a deportation proceeding did not have the same burden 
of proof as an immigrant in an exclusion proceeding, which made 
deportation proceedings more favorable to an immigrant. This 
 
 160. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, 2013 WL 8211660, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 
July 31, 2013). 
 161. Id. at *3 (“While the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of 
their claim challenging the Directive and Morton Memorandum as contrary to the provisions of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, see generally Mem. Op. & Order, Apr. 23, 2013, ECF No. 
58, Congress has determined that this Court does not have jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 162. Ann R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on its Own Path, 33 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 491, 519 (2011) (“[T]he doctrine of constitutional avoidance and ‘the longstanding principle 
of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien’ may cause the 
Court to favor noncitizens when interpreting immigration statutes.”). 
 163. Martin, supra note 158, at 170–71. 
 164. Id. at 172–73. 
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distinction had some anomalous results. For example, a person with 
no visa who snuck across the border would be accorded more 
process than a person attempting to make a lawful entry with a travel 
document whose admissibility was questioned.165 The 1996 
amendment sought to eliminate this absurd result by specifying that 
any person who was had not been admitted or inspected was an 
applicant for admission.166 Professor Martin further notes that not all 
DACA-eligible immigrants were entrants without inspection (EWI). 
Upwards of half of these immigrants were admitted, or paroled, and 
ultimately overstayed their status.167 The plaintiffs’ position, which 
eliminates prosecutorial discretion, would actually apply to EWI but 
not to those who have overstayed. But Professor Martin goes even 
further to argue that the plain language and legislative history of INA 
§ 235 does not statutorily bar prosecutorial discretion for EWIs.168 
Consequently, while this litigation has been dismissed, a court 
has yet to rule on the merits of the legal dilemma: Does the INA 
provide immigration officers with prosecutorial discretion? Given 
this controversy, Congress could seek to clarify this question or, 
given the congressional discontent with the DACA directive, could 
seek to further limit the use of prosecutorial discretion by DHS. 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 173 (“In short, the key factor in determining which substantive provisions apply 
and which procedures govern is now admission, not entry.”).  
 167. See id. at 171. 
 168. Professor Martin discusses a complicated issue that arose during the drafting of the 1996 
amendments, as well as how individuals who have been paroled into the United States should be 
categorized, immediately after their parole status lapses, as if they were actively trying to depart 
from the United States. Id. at 173–77. His discussion of the Board of Immigration case Matter of 
Badalmenti and its impact on the legislative drafting process is significant but beyond the scope 
of this article. Ultimately, this case was the reason Congress provided broad discretion on when, 
in the immigration process, to charge an EWI with inadmissibility regardless of the holding in 
Badalmenti. Id. at 177. 
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IV.  CRIMINAL LAW: PROVIDING ALTERNATIVES TO  
ENHANCE THE USE OF PROSECUTORIAL 
 DISCRETION BY ICE PROSECUTORS 
A.  Use of Prosecutorial Discretion in  
Federal Criminal Law 
The American legal tradition of prosecutorial discretion has its 
roots in English criminal law,169 the U.S. Constitution,170 and the 
ethical duty of prosecutors to “seek justice.”171 The phrase 
“prosecutorial discretion” was first used in the Supreme Court case 
Poe v. Ullman.172 As its notion has evolved, courts have justified the 
use of prosecutorial discretion by relying on a mixture of separation 
 
 169. Historically, private citizens brought forth criminal prosecutions generally on behalf of 
the Crown. Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 547 (2005). 
The nolle prosequi was a procedural power granted to the English attorney general to dismiss 
pending cases and was often exercised at the discretion of the Crown, and was not reviewable by 
the court. Id. at 579; see Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal 
Law: Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 16 (2009) (citing Abraham S. 
Goldstein, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 12 
(1981)). “[W]hen the Attorney General issued a nolle, the court would terminate the prosecution 
without any inquiry.” Kraus, supra (citing Goldstein, supra). Even if brought by a private citizen, 
criminal prosecutions were ultimately considered the province of the Crown. “By our 
constitution, the King is entrusted with the prosecution of all crimes which disturb the peace and 
order of society . . . . [F]or that reason, all proceedings, ‘ad vindictam et pœnam’ are called in the 
law, the pleas or suits of the Crown . . . . As indictments and informations, granted by the King’s 
Bench, are the King’s suits, and under his controul [sic]; informations filed by his Attorney 
General, are most emphatically his suits, because they are the immediate emanations of his will 
and pleasure.” Wilkes v. The King, (1768) 97 Eng. Rep. 123 (K.B.) 125. As the American 
colonies were settled, the nolle prosequi was adopted as a part of early American criminal law. 
See Krauss, supra at 16. Governors of the colonies or district attorneys “could direct and end 
official prosecutions.” Prakash, supra (citing Oliver W. Hammonds, The Attorney General in the 
American Colonies, in 2 ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY SERIES 1, 5, 7, 9, 11, 16, 20 
(1939)). 
 170. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (confirming the authority of the executive to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context stems from the Take Care Clause); see also 
MANUEL & GARVEY, supra note 99 (explaining that “prosecutorial discretion may be 
appropriately characterized as a constitutionally based doctrine.”). 
 171. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1983) (“The responsibility of a 
public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely 
convict.”); Paul M. Secunda, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop of Sentencing Uniformity: Guiding 
the Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through the Use of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1281 (1997); see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
3.8, cmt. 1 (2004). 
 172. 367 U.S. 497, 530 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to a prosecutor’s right to 
enforce statutes); Krauss, supra note 169, at 26. 
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of powers,173 the Take Care Clause,174 and the duties of a prosecutor 
as an appointee of the president.175 Hence, judicial review of a 
prosecutor’s exercise of discretion176 is limited to “vindictive” or 
unconstitutional uses of power, which the Supreme Court has held 
are “both reviewable and impermissible.”177 
Prosecutorial discretion covers a wide array of decisions made 
in criminal cases, ranging from whether to bring charges, to whether 
to dismiss a case or to plea bargain with the defendant.178 Moreover, 
prosecutorial discretion allows prosecutors to prioritize cases when 
resources are scarce, when caseloads are heavy, when the evidence 
available is not sufficient to secure a conviction,179 and finally, when 
there are compelling humanitarian reasons to not pursue 
prosecution.180 Today, the criminal justice system cannot function 
without prosecutorial discretion.181 
Title IX of the United States Attorneys’ Manual, entitled 
Principles of Federal Prosecution, offers approximately forty pages 
outlining the use of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context 
 
 173. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch 
has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”) 
(citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1869)). 
 174. U.S. CONST., art. II § 3. 
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (“The Attorney 
General is the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the United States in legal 
proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses, be faithfully executed . . . . Although as a member 
of the bar, the attorney for the United States is an officer of the court, he is nevertheless an 
executive official of the Government, and it is as an officer of the executive department that he 
exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular case. It 
follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to 
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in 
their control over criminal prosecutions.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 176. See, e.g., Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1869); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 
479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 177. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 846 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing 
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974)). 
 178. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 
1525 (1981). 
 179. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, United States Attorney Manual § 9-27.230 (2002), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9 
-27.230. 
 180. See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1892 (2000) 
(prosecutor’s “power is widely seen as necessary, and frequently a good thing: It permits mercy, 
and it avoids flooding the system with low-level crimes”). 
 181. Mary Patrice Brown & Steven E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial 
Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1063, 1064 (arguing that “plea bargaining is a defining, if not the defining, feature of the present 
federal criminal justice system”). 
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and provides guidance to United States Attorneys at nearly every 
stage of a criminal proceeding, from initiating prosecution to 
sentencing.182 The Principles of Federal Prosecution is “cast in 
general terms with a view to providing guidance rather than to 
mandating results.”183 Central to the prosecutorial discretion 
guidelines is the notion that “[t]he manner in which Federal 
Prosecutors exercise their decision-making authority has far-reaching 
implications, both in terms of justice and effectiveness in law 
enforcement and in terms of the consequences for individual 
citizens.”184 
1.  Prosecutors Have a Duty to Seek Justice 
Embedded in the manual’s guidance is the notion that 
prosecutorial discretion in criminal law is anchored to the 
prosecutor’s professional and ethical duty “to seek justice.”185 This 
duty can be traced to a mid-1800s essay, which was the basis for the 
American Bar Association’s first code of ethics.186 In part, this duty 
beseeches a prosecutor to not prosecute a person whom she believes 
to be innocent.187 The Supreme Court has invoked this professional 
canon in admonishing overzealous prosecutors.188 This unique role 
“places prosecutors somewhere between judges, on the one hand, 
and lawyers advocating on behalf of private clients, on the other.”189 
In addition, prosecutors are viewed not solely as advocates, but they 
 
 182. See id. at 1076; Department of Justice, supra note 179, at §§ 9-27.001–760. 
 183. Department of Justice, supra note 179, at § 9-27.001. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8, cmt. 1; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 
(“The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to 
seek justice, not merely convict.”); see also Secunda, supra note 171, at 1281 (“All current and 
past ethical rules for prosecutors operate, to one degree or another, under the premise that 
prosecutors should not merely convict, but they should attempt to ‘do justice.’”). 
 186. See Bruce Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 
612 n.10 (1998–1999) (citing to Hon. George Sharswood, AN ESSAY ON THE PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICS (F.B. Rothman 5th ed. 1993) (1854). 
 187. See, e.g., Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16, 22–23 (1874) (“[A] public prosecutor is not a 
plaintiff’s attorney, but a sworn minister of justice, as much bound to protect the innocent as to 
pursue the guilty . . . .”). 
 188. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (criticizing the prosecutor’s conduct, 
stating “The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, 
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to 
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done.”). 
 189. See Green, supra note 186, at 615 (citing to AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 35, Standard 3-
1.2(b) (“‘The prosecutor is an administer of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court.’”). 
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are also required to seek justice.190 Prosecutors also may not seek 
waivers to important pretrial rights from unrepresented defendants.191 
Moreover, prosecutors have an independent ethical obligation to 
disclose to a defendant any exculpatory evidence—that is, evidence 
that mitigates culpability, both during a trial, as well as in the 
sentencing phase.192 
Generally speaking, criminal prosecutors are confronted with the 
decision to exercise discretion in two situations.193 First, the 
prosecutor must believe that the individual suspected of committing 
a crime is indeed guilty of the act.194 This is where the duty to seek 
justice is most often invoked and easily understood. If the United 
States’ justice system is grounded in the rule of law, then an innocent 
person should not be convicted or jailed for a crime she did not 
commit.195 While due process is the constitutional embodiment of 
this value, the prosecutor’s duty to seek justice is the ethical 
guarantee. Second, a prosecutor can exercise discretion even where 
the prosecutor believes a person did violate a criminal statute. In this 
instance, a prosecutor may choose not to pursue a conviction or may 
argue for leniency.196 The reasons are plenary. For instance, the 
prosecutor may not have the required resources to charge and try 
every person who has committed a criminal act and therefore must 
prioritize who to pursue.197 Or the prosecutor may want to provide 
leniency or immunity for one individual in order to pursue a criminal 
accomplice.198 Finally, a prosecutor may decide that the punishment 
 
 190. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8, cmt. 1. 
 191. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c) (2004); see, e.g., Hood v. State, 546 
N.E.2d 847, 849–50 (Ind. App. 1989) (“Here, not only did the State plea bargain with an 
uncounseled defendant, it also made the uncounseled defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel as 
a condition of the plea agreement.”). 
 192. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004). 
 193. See Green, supra note 186, at 634. 
 194. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 195. Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405, 415–16 (1872) (stating “[a]nd however strong may be his 
belief of the prisoner’s guilt, he must remember that, though unfair means may happen to result in 
doing justice to the prisoner in the particular case, yet, justice so attained, is unjust and dangerous 
to the whole community.”). 
 196. See Vorenberg, supra note 178, at 1527. 
 197. See Arthur Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in Criminal Justice, 46 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 12 (1972–1973) (quoting Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 427 (1960)). 
 198. See R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us 
About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice”, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 653–55 
(2006) (explaining that virtue is something acquired by practice and training, assumes that the 
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for the crime is too harsh or that there are compelling circumstances 
that warrant not charging an individual.199 
Professor Bruce Green notes that the responsibility to seek 
justice is most often advanced by two theories: (1) the prosecutor’s 
power, and (2) the prosecutor’s professional role in representing the 
sovereign.200 First, a prosecutor’s immense amount of power creates 
an inherit imbalance of power between prosecutor and criminal 
defendants. Prosecutors have more resources than their adversaries—
that is, they are equipped with more funding and personnel. Their 
adversaries are marginalized, powerless, and often indigent.201 In 
addition, prosecutors have broad powers as extensions of the 
sovereign, which include the power to apply for search warrants and 
arrest warrants, the power to conduct wiretaps, and the power to 
grant immunity from prosecution.202 They also make decisions on 
behalf of the government, not just for a client.203 
Second, Professor Green asserts, “the duty to seek justice is the 
prosecutor’s professional role,” which “make[s] prosecutors different 
from other government lawyers and from lawyers for even the most 
powerful private clients.”204 It is this role of representing the 
sovereign, not just simply serving as a lawyer for the sovereign, 
which distinguishes a prosecutor and thereby creates this affirmative 
obligation to carry out the sovereign’s overarching objective in 
criminal law to “do justice.”205 Professor Green argues that in 
addition to enforcing the criminal code and avoiding punishment of 
the innocent, the sovereign has two additional primary objectives: 
One is to treat individuals with proportionality, that is, to 
ensure that individuals are not punished more harshly than 
deserved. The other is to treat lawbreakers with rough 
equality; that is, similarly situated individuals should 
generally be treated the same way. Sometimes these various 
 
person will do the right thing most of time, requires practical wisdom, and is acquired through 
deliberation, judgment, and decision). 
 199. See Vorenberg, supra note 178, at 1551. 
 200. See Green, supra note 186, at 635. 
 201. Id. at 626. 
 202. Id. at 626 (quoting N.Y.S. Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 
683 at 3 (1996)). 
 203. Id. at 627–28. 
 204. Id. at 633. 
 205. Id. at 634. 
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objectives are in tension. It is the prosecutor’s task, in 
carrying out the sovereign’s objectives, to resolve whatever 
tension exists among them in the context of individual 
cases.206 
The prosecutor’s role is not only to represent the sovereign but also 
to act as if she were the sovereign, and to make decisions that “the 
client,” her country, would typically make. 
2.  Charging Decisions 
Prosecutors are also permitted to decline to prosecute a case that 
is supported by legal evidence, when the punishment is 
disproportionate or harsh.207 In making such a determination, 
prosecutors may consider “[the] insignificance of wrongdoing, the 
defendant’s prior exemplary conduct, or the defendant’s frail 
physical condition.”208 The Principles of Federal Prosecution 
instructs prosecutors to decline to prosecute cases where: (1) no 
substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution, (2) the 
person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, or 
(3) there exists adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.209 
In deciding whether there is a federal interest, federal prosecutors are 
instructed to consider both federal enforcement priorities as well as 
the nature and seriousness of the offense. The manual instructs 
prosecutors not to waste federal resources on “inconsequential cases 
or cases in which the violation is only technical.”210 Prosecutors are 
to also consider the person’s personal circumstances including age, 
mental or physical impairment, and other compelling factors unique 
to the accused.211 
Federal criminal prosecutors are required to document their 
decision not to prosecute and articulate the reasons for exercising a 
favorable grant of discretion.212 While police officers apprehend an 
individual based on probable cause that the individual committed a 
 
 206. See id.  
 207. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 35, Standard 3-3.9(b)(iii). 
 208. See Green, supra note 186, at 623. 
 209. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, United States Attorney Manual 6 (2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.230. 
 210. Id. at 7. 
 211. Id. at 8–9. 
 212. Id. at 13. 
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crime, it is ultimately up to the prosecutor to decide whether to try 
the individual. 
B.  Critiques of the Use of Prosecutorial  
Discretion in Criminal Law 
The ethical mandate for prosecutors to “seek justice” in deciding 
when to exercise a favorable grant of discretion is not a panacea for 
abuse of power or arbitrary decision-making. There are legitimate 
concerns about the use of prosecutorial discretion in criminal law. If 
prosecutorial discretion in criminal law has value, then it is 
paramount for the immigration system that, when designing an 
effective model for ICE trial attorneys, DHS understands the 
challenges criminal prosecutors face in fulfilling their ethical 
obligation to seek justice. Critics lament that prosecutorial discretion 
is a law enforcement tool subject to little oversight or limitation by 
the legislative and judicial branches of government.213 In addition, 
prosecutors will decline to prosecute a case due to lack of sufficient 
admissible evidence, compelling life circumstances of the accused, 
other larger systemic office or agency priorities, or simply a lack of 
resources. Related is the criticism that prosecutors are making case-
by-case determinations based on their own personality, whims, and 
preferences, which have little, if nothing, to do with the defendant 
and the alleged conduct.214 Yet, this criticism is not ontological; 
rather, it is normative. It is not the existence of the awesome power 
to decide whether to prosecute that is problematic; rather, the 
challenge arises when an individual prosecutor exercises (or does not 
exercise) this power in an appropriate way given the particular 
circumstances.215 
While there are some outer limits on discretion—both external 
limits216 and self-imposed limitations217—federal prosecutors are not 
 
 213. See Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762, 764–65 (D.C. 1963) (stating “[t]he prerogative 
of enforcing the criminal law was vested by the Constitution, therefore, not in the Courts, nor in 
private citizens, but squarely in the executive arm of the government.”), aff’d sub. nom. Moses v. 
Katzenbach, 342 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1539–42. 
 214. See Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1534; Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal 
Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1439, 1440 (2004). 
 215. See Green, supra note 186, at 619–21. 
 216. External limitations include judicial review of a plea agreement, judicial doctrine against 
retaliatory prosecutions, and the criminal code. See Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1537–43 
(discussing the external limitations on prosecutorial discretion). 
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bound by any formal regulations.218 In addition, prosecutorial 
discretion suffers from regional disparity and, as a result, there is a 
lack of prosecutorial consistency throughout the country. In the 
federal system, the U.S. Attorneys’ offices are primarily responsible 
for the prosecution of federal law offenders.219 These decisions are 
serious not only for the U.S. government, but also for the victims and 
their families, and criminal investigators, as well as the defendants, 
and their families and communities.220 Yet, the decision to prosecute 
on similar facts will vary depending on the office. Congress 
expressed concern about the lack of consistency among the U.S. 
Attorneys’ offices across the country.221 This resulted in then 
Attorney General Civiletti issuing the Principle of Prosecution in 
1980. Professor James Vorenberg argued that this memo pushed 
discretion up the chain of command within the various offices, but 
failed to create consistency among them.222 
The most compelling and sophisticated criticism about 
prosecutorial discretion is the fact that there is no concrete guidance 
or judicial explanation on what it means to “seek justice.” This 
mandate is amorphous. In trying to create a workable architecture for 
this duty, Professor Michael Cassidy argues that virtue—“in 
particular Aristotelian virtues of courage, fairness, honesty, and 
prudence”223—should inform what it means to seek justice, and he 
also contends that prosecutors, as individuals, must possess virtue to 
be successful.224 He recommends that, to ensure that prosecutors are 
 
 217. Internal limitations can range from formally adopted regulations to informal customs and 
in between office memoranda and public or internal statements. See id. at 1543–45. 
 218. See Leland Beck, The Administrative Law of Criminal Prosecution: The Development of 
Prosecutorial Policy, 27 AMER. U. L. REV. 310, 313–21 (1978) (concluding that while the U.S. 
Department of Justice has guidelines for exercising prosecutorial discretion they are not binding 
regulations); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can 
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 47–52 (1991) (arguing that the noncompetitive 
“do justice” approach is inadequate because the professional codes do not exempt prosecutors 
from the requirements of zealous advocacy). 
 219. See O’Neill, supra note 214, at 1440. 
 220. Id. at 1442. 
 221. See Vorenberg, supra note 8, at 1543–44 (discussing the findings of the congressional 
committee investigating use of prosecutorial discretion in U.S. Attorney offices and Congress’s 
subsequent demand for guidelines and policies to cure the regional disparity). 
 222. Id. at 1545. 
 223. Cassidy, supra note 198, at 640. 
 224. Id. Cassidy discusses that virtue is something acquired by practice and training, assumes 
that the person will do the right thing most of time, requires practical wisdom, which is acquired 
through deliberation, judgment, and decision. In addition, he concludes that the rules of 
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able to fulfill their ethical mandate to seek justice, prosecutor offices 
should be selective about whom they hire and should proactively 
create positive role models and mentors for young attorneys.225 
Ultimately, Professor Cassidy concludes: “Finally, my analysis leads 
me to one cautiously optimistic observation about the professional 
life of prosecutors. As elastic and amorphous as the ‘seek justice’ 
obligation may seem, it can be a source of professional aspiration 
and satisfaction for virtuous prosecutors who take it seriously.”226 
C.  Why Criminal Law Principles Matter in 
 Immigration Cases: Consequences of Removal 
In recent years, Congress has actively criminalized non-violent, 
minor immigration violations and stripped immigration judges of 
almost all authority to exercise favorable discretion in cases where 
the equities may merit suspending deportation.227 Moreover, the 
federal judiciary is extremely limited in what immigration decisions 
it can take on appeal. The existing draconian laws, coupled with 
recent court-stripping provisions, increase the stakes for an 
immigrant facing removal. As a result, there is a growing recognition 
by the Supreme Court that immigration, while it may not be solely a 
creature of criminal law, bears a greater resemblance to criminal law 
than civil law, where it has been historically situated. 
The consequences of losing a case before an immigration judge 
are dire.228 Immigrants in removal proceedings often face 
consequences akin to a criminal conviction; however, immigration 
proceedings are civil in nature.229 Moreover, immigration laws are 
 
professional responsibility do not provide enough guidance to prosecutors who are faced with 
external political pressures, internal pressures, daunting workloads, and underfunded and 
understaffed offices, and usually don’t have all the information needed to make an informed 
decision. Id. at 652–53. 
 225. Id. at 693–94. 
 226. Id. at 694. 
 227. See Memorandum by Doris Meissner, supra note 4, at 1. “Since the 1996 amendments to 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) which limited the authority of immigration judges to 
provide relief from removal in many cases, there has been increased attention to the scope and 
exercise of the [INS’s] prosecutorial discretion.” Id. 
 228. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); Jennifer L. Coyler et al., Increasing 
Pro Bono Activity: The Representational and Counseling Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 461, 464 (2009) (citing Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)) (noting 
“removal can ‘result . . . in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living’”). 
 229. See generally W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re 
Winship, Stigma, and Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2011) (discussing the 
case law distinguishing criminal and civil law and arguing for an alternative litmus test, including 
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complex, constantly changing, and often inaccessible.230 Justice 
Stevens, in delivering the opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Padilla v. Kentucky231 concluded, “changes to our immigration law 
have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal 
conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens 
accused of crimes has never been more important.”232 
The Supreme Court held in Padilla that deportation is not just a 
mere collateral consequence of a criminal plea.233 Therefore, while 
the petitioner was not entitled to government counsel, he could bring 
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in challenging his criminal 
conviction, based on his criminal defense attorney’s failure to inform 
him of the immigration consequences of his plea.234 In Padilla, the 
petitioner was a lawful permanent resident of the United States for 
over forty years235 who pled guilty to a drug charge that made his 
deportation “presumptively mandatory.”236 Prior to accepting the 
plea, Padilla’s attorney did not inform him that deportation was a 
possibility; in fact, his attorney assured him that the charge would 
have no bearing on his immigration status.237 Padilla argued 
ineffective assistance of counsel; however, the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky held that the Sixth Amendment did not protect a criminal 
defendant from unreliable advice about deportation because the 
immigration issue was not within the state court’s sentencing 
authority, and thus was a collateral consequence.238 The U.S. 
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that deportation has long been 
recognized as a severe penalty and that “[a]lthough removal 
proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately 
 
whether some sort of stigma is imposed and whether or not someone is deprived of liberty in 
determining when and what constitutional-guaranteed procedural protections should attach to a 
given procedure). 
 230. See Careen Shannon, Addressing Inadequate Representation: Regulating Immigration 
Legal Service Providers: Inadequate Representation and Notario Fraud, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
577, 579 (2009) (referring to federal judges’ remarks on the complexity of U.S. immigration 
laws). 
 231. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 232. Id. at 364. 
 233. Id. at 366. 
 234. Id. at 368–69. 
 235. Id. at 359. 
 236. Id. at 369. 
 237. Id. at 359. 
 238. Id. at 359–60. 
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related to the criminal process.”239 As a result, the Court held that 
“advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the 
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel”240 and that 
Strickland v. Washington241 applied to Padilla’s claim.242 
Padilla has laid some important groundwork about what is at 
stake for immigrants faced with deportation. First, the case firmly 
establishes that both the severity of deportation and its frequent ties 
to criminal prosecution require some level of protection in the 
context of plea arrangements.243 Justice Stevens’s recount of the 
increasing strictness of mandatory deportation regulations, and the 
rapid decline in the amount of authority provided to judges to set 
aside deportation after weighing other competing concerns, 
demonstrates that individuals facing deportation need adequate 
representation.244 No longer is discretionary relief prominent; as 
Justice Stevens states, “changes to our immigration law have 
dramatically raised the stakes . . . . The importance of accurate legal 
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more 
important.”245 
Padilla also underscores the severe consequences of losing an 
immigration case.246 Justice Stevens focused on the severity of 
deportation and the need for legal advice when deportation is a 
consequence of the commission of a crime, yet there are a significant 
 
 239. Id. at 365 (citation omitted). 
 240. Id. at 366. 
 241. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing reasonably effective assistance as a constitutional 
requirement and devising a two-prong test to be used when analyzing whether defense counsel’s 
performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness). 
 242. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366. 
 243. Id. at 359–62. In fact, this decision has spurred scholars to renew arguments for 
government-funded counsel in immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Alice Chapman, Petty 
Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen 
Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585, 603 (2011) (arguing that the Padilla 
decision calls in question the current assumptions on what cases trigger Sixth Amendment 
protection and could allow courts to revisit the scope of the Sixth Amendment without 
overturning Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)). 
 244. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359–62. 
 245. Id. at 364. 
 246. Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: 
Challenging Construction of the Fifth-And-A-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1474–75 
(2011) (arguing the majority opinion in Padilla begins to see punitive nature of deportation); see 
also Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1332 (2011) 
(arguing that the Padilla decision is a departure from previous United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, which had held deportation was purely civil in nature, whereas in Padilla the Court 
recognized that deportation is related to the criminal process). 
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number of individuals who did not commit crimes but face removal 
from the country.247 These individuals must navigate the complex 
and unforgiving immigration system without any procedural 
safeguards—not knowing that one small mistake may render it 
impermissible for them to remain in the United States. This Supreme 
Court decision has been used to advance arguments for why 
immigrants facing removal should be afforded a government-funded 
counsel in the civil immigration proceeding.248 This decision also 
underscores the need to import other trappings of the criminal justice 
system and require prosecutors to “seek justice” in immigration law. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE USE OF 
 PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
A.  Decisions to Prosecute Should Rest with the Prosecutor:  
Why ICE Attorneys Should Have Sole Authority to  
Issue Charging Documents 
One of the major differences between the historical development 
of prosecutorial development in immigration law and criminal law is 
that in immigration law it is not just the prosecutors—that is, the 
government lawyers representing the state’s interest—who have been 
accorded discretion;249 instead, other executive branch agents, such 
as immigration enforcement officers and border patrol agents, have 
been accorded this awesome power to decide who to deport. 
Currently, almost any immigration officer has the authority to issue 
 
 247. The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) does not keep statistics on what 
type of relief was sought by a Respondent placed in removal proceedings. However, EOIR does 
track the number of asylum cases before immigration judges. In fiscal year 2011, there were 
338,114 cases before the immigration court system and approximately 576 of those cases were 
requests for asylum. OFFICE OF PLANNING ANALYSIS & TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK C1–C3 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter FY 2011 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK], available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy11syb.pdf. 
 248. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 243, at 589 (arguing that the Sixth Amendment right to 
government-funded counsel should be extended to immigrants in removal proceedings in light of 
the Supreme Court of the United States’ holding in Padilla). 
 249. CENTER FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY’S DICKENSON 
SCHOOL OF LAW, TO FILE OR NOT TO FILE A NOTICE TO APPEAR: IMPROVING THE 
GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 51–52 (2013) (citing an email from Judge 
Bruce Einhorn lamenting that “one of the great regulatory flaws” in the immigration system is 
allowing non-attorneys to file NTAs and how this differs greatly from federal district court cases 
in which a U.S. Attorney or Assistant U.S. Attorney is required to sign off on all complaints and 
subsequent pleadings and is therefore “accountable for the filing and substance of the 
documents”), available at https://law.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/NTAReportFinal 
.pdf. 
48.1 CORCORAN PAGINATED 4/16/2015  5:28 PM 
Fall 2014] SEEK JUSTICE, NOT DEPORTATION 167 
an NTA.250 In criminal law, the corollary would be that a police or 
parole officer, a detective, or a police chief could indict a suspected 
criminal and a trial would commence. While an ICE trial attorney 
represents the government in the hearing and is an immigrant’s 
adversary, there is no requirement that the immigration prosecutor 
decide to go forward with a trial for the proceedings to commence 
and confer jurisdiction to the immigration court.251 While almost any 
immigration officer can initiate a removal proceeding, once the NTA 
has been filed with the immigration court, jurisdiction over the 
hearing is vested solely with the immigration court252 or the charging 
agent, who can withdraw the NTA.253 Therefore, even if the ICE trial 
attorney agrees with the noncitizen and moves to dismiss the 
proceedings, the decision rests with the immigration judge.254 
In October 2013, the Center for Immigrants’ Rights at Penn 
State’s Dickinson School of Law prepared a report for the American 
Bar Association Commission on Immigration entitled To File or Not 
to File a Notice to Appear: Improving the Government’s Use of 
Prosecutorial Discretion.255 In gathering information for this report, 
the authors surveyed immigration attorneys, filed Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests, and interviewed attorneys, 
advocates, and scholars.256 The authors discovered that the 
individuals placed in removal proceedings were not the types of 
cases that DHS has identified as high-priority cases for 
deportation.257 In addition, DHS filed NTAs against a significant 
number of noncitizens who were ultimately granted some type of 
relief by the EOIR.258 This report ultimately concluded that  
DHS may not be consistently exercising favorable 
prosecutorial discretion in issuing and filing NTAs in 
 
 250. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14, 239.1 (2013). 
 251. Id. § 239.1 (listing forty-one different categories of employees at DHS who have the 
authority to file a NTA and commence removal proceedings against a noncitizen). 
 252. Id. § 1003.14. 
 253. Id.. § 239.2(a). 
 254. Id. § 239.2(c); Bavakan Avetisyan, 25 I&N 688 (Bd. Of Immigration Appeals Jan. 31, 
2012); Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Executive Office for Immigration Review on Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 
13-01: Continuances and Administrative Closure (Mar. 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm13/13-01.pdf. 
 255. CENTER FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, supra note 249, at 1. 
 256. Id. at 4. 
 257. Id. at 5. 
 258. Id. 
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appropriate cases as prescribed in various memoranda. As 
the survey results show, instead of focusing their limited 
enforcement resources exclusively on high priority 
individuals, DHS has initiated removal proceedings against 
low priority individuals without sufficiently considering the 
equities.259  
A very pragmatic step toward increasing consistency in charging 
decisions would be to further limit who at DHS has the authority to 
issue NTAs. The authors of this report recommended that DHS 
“[e]stablish a permanent program requiring approval of a DHS 
lawyer prior to the filing of any NTA by a DHS officer.”260 
This would be a vast improvement over the current system, but 
even further changes are necessary. Given the severity of deportation 
as a consequence, ICE trial attorneys should have the sole discretion 
to issue NTAs. This is not to say other agents or attorneys within 
DHS cannot be consulted, or provide recommendations to ICE 
prosecutors and their supervisors. The apprehending DHS agents, or 
adjudication officers, would provide an affidavit or statement of the 
facts articulating the reasons they believe the immigrant should be 
placed in removal proceedings. This record, along with agency 
guidance on enforcement, would serve as material information for 
the ICE trial attorneys as he or she decides whether to commence 
removal proceedings against a particular individual. 
As with criminal prosecutors, ICE attorneys are resource 
deficient. They do not have the funding and personnel to try every 
noncitizen on their docket. ICE attorneys are authorized to exercise 
discretion261 and grant requests from a noncitizen’s attorney to 
administratively close the case262 or defer action. Like criminal 
prosecutors, ICE attorneys are responsible for charging the 
 
 259. Id. at 45–46. 
 260. Id. at 56. 
 261. Memorandum from Peter Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on Case-By-Case Review of Incoming and 
Certain Pending Cases, to all Chief Counsel and Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 2 (Nov. 17, 2011), available 
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain 
-pending-cases-memorandum.pdf. 
 262. Administrative closure is a procedure in which the Immigration Judge or Board of 
Immigration Appeals moves a case from its docket as a matter of administrative convenience. See 
Avetisyan, supra note 254, at 690. A joint motion from the ICE attorney and the Respondent 
initiates the process. See id. 
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noncitizen with removability. If DHS adopts the recommendation to 
limit the NTA-issuing authority to ICE attorneys, they would serve 
as the gatekeeper to determine if removal hearings are appropriate.263 
ICE attorneys, like criminal prosecutors, would have the full 
authority to decline charging an immigrant, as well as the authority 
to terminate the adjudication later on for resource or humanitarian 
reasons. 
In addition, ICE trial attorneys should be required to file a 
memorandum accompanying each NTA. The memorandum would 
articulate in writing the reasons that this particular immigrant’s 
deportation is a departmental priority. Currently, the existence of 
internal agency guidance is not being fully operationalized at local 
levels.264 This documenting requirement would expand on the 
already existing requirement for DHS officers, agents, or attorneys to 
provide written documentation when they decide to exercise 
discretion favorably.265 Currently, if prosecutorial discretion is 
exercised, the DHS employee must provide the legal and factual 
basis for his or her decision and place this document in the 
immigrant’s file.266 By requiring the ICE trial attorney to articulate 
his or her rationale for each decision about whether to commence 
removal proceedings, the attorney must be familiar with the factors 
to consider when choosing whether to exercise discretion. It also 
provides a mechanism to determine if prosecutorial discretion is 
being applied consistently around the country. 
B.  Grounding Prosecutorial Discretion for ICE  
Attorneys in the Ethical Obligation to Seek Justice 
On June 17, 2011, John Morton issued comprehensive guidance 
on prosecutorial discretion. The first memorandum articulated 
comprehensive instructions to ICE agents, officers, and attorneys 
about exercising discretion at all stages of the immigration 
enforcement process.267 The second memorandum addressed victims, 
 
 263. See Memorandum from John Morton on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 
18, at 2–3. 
 264. See CENTER FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, supra note 249, at 60. 
 265. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See Memorandum from John Morton on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 
18, at 1–6. 
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witnesses, and plaintiffs in civil rights actions.268 Yet, despite this 
high-level guidance, an overwhelming number of ICE trial attorneys 
did not change their practices based on the directives.269 Recently, 
the American Immigration Council surveyed 252 cases representing 
all of the ICE field offices and offices of chief counsel that were 
active after the Morton Memos were issued.270 The study concluded 
that in the majority of offices, ICE agents, trial attorneys, and 
supervisors admitted that they had not implemented the memoranda 
and that no changes were made to policy or practice.271 Moreover, 
many trial attorneys indicated that they had not received further 
guidance or training on how to execute the June 17, 2011 Morton 
Memos.272 The Obama administration has clearly expressed a 
preference for using prosecutorial discretion to administratively close 
cases, grant deferred action, and to forgo placing individuals in 
removal proceedings when the noncitizens are not an enforcement 
priority and do not threaten public safety or national security.273 The 
administration’s stance, however, has not changed the entrenched 
culture among ICE trial attorneys that their primary responsibility is 
to deport.274 There needs to be cultural change among ICE attorneys 
that their primary responsibility is to seek justice. 
 
 268. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
on Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs, to Field Office Directors, 
Special Agents in Charge and Chief Counsel (June 17, 2011), available at https://www.ice.gov 
/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf. 
 269. ALEXSA ALONZO ET AL., AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, HOLDING DHS 
ACCOUNTABLE ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 4 (Nov. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=37615. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See id. 
 274. CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUSTICE, ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO 
REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS, 16–18 (2009), available at 
http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Assembly-Line-Injustice-Blueprint-to-
Reform-Americas-Immigration-Courts1.pdf (noting tendency of ICE attorneys to adhere to 
“deport-in-all-cases culture”); BETSY CAVENDISH & STEVE SCHULMAN, CHI. APPLESEED FUND 
FOR JUSTICE, REIMAGINING THE IMMIGRATION COURT ASSEMBLY LINE: TRANSFORMATIVE 
CHANGE FOR THE IMMIGRATION JUSTICE SYSTEM 39–48 (2012), available at 
http://www.appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Reimagining-the-Immigration 
-Court-Assembly-Line.pdf (observing persistence of ICE’s “deport at all costs” approach in 
immigration court); ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 9, 2010), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/243/ (reporting between one-third and one-half of ICE’s 
deportation requests are rejected by immigration courts). Yet, there is one phenomenal exception 
to this deportation-centered mentality. See Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police: ICE 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180, 181–84 
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While there are several memoranda, including the recent Morton 
Memos, memorializing how prosecutorial discretion should be 
understood and applied, there is not a central prosecutor handbook or 
manual akin to the U.S. Attorney Manual. The Meissner 
Memorandum references the U.S. Attorney Manual as the framework 
for prosecutorial discretion in immigration.275 The EOIR has recently 
completed the Immigration Court Practice Manual,276 which it 
updates regularly.277 Accordingly, ICE should also have a manual 
similar to the U.S. Attorney Manual and the EOIR Immigration 
Court Practice Manual. 
The manual should include specific instructions to ICE trial 
attorneys that they are duty bound to seek justice, not just 
deportation. And in seeking justice, the ICE attorney has an 
affirmative obligation to make sure that a person who is eligible for 
affirmative relief to removal is not denied that relief. When a 
noncitizen is placed in removal proceedings, there are affirmative 
defenses that will allow particularly vulnerable individuals to remain 
in the United States even if they have overstayed their visa or entered 
the country illegally. Such affirmative defenses include asylum,278 
temporary protected status,279 and cancellation of removal.280 In 
these circumstances, ICE attorneys may either work with the 
noncitizen in support of their application, or may actively oppose it 
and advocate for the immigration judge to deny this relief.281 
In addition, the immigrant, not the ICE prosecutor, has the 
burden of proof in removal proceedings to establish that he or she is 
 
(2013) (documenting the herculean efforts of ICE trial attorneys in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
who administratively closed deportation cases against noncitizens who were arrested unlawfully 
by local police officers); see AM. BAR ASSOC. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND 
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 1-25 to 1-29 (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_comp
lete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf (noting “[i]nsufficient use of prosecutorial discretion” as a 
systemic issue). 
 275. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 4, at 4–5. 
 276. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 
(Aug. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Practice_Manual_1 
-27-14.pdf. 
 277. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration Court Practice Manual Current Updates, 
JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/current_updates.html. 
 278. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). 
 279. Id. § 1254(a). 
 280. Id. § 1229b(a), (b). 
 281. See Memorandum from William J. Howard, supra note 29, at 1–2. 
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eligible for immigration relief and should not be deported.282 
Conversely, in criminal law, the state carries the high burden of 
proving the criminal defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
As a result, unlike criminal prosecutors, who are duty bound to make 
their own professional assessment about the guilt of an individual 
before pursuing charges and to not rely on defense counsel making 
the case, ICE attorneys have no professional ethical requirement to 
make such an assessment before seeking removal of a noncitizen. 
Despite this disparity in ethical obligations, ICE attorneys and 
criminal prosecutors’ power and professional roles are quite similar. 
The two recognized justifications for criminal prosecutors’ duty to 
seek justice equally apply in the immigration context: the 
prosecutor’s power and the prosecutor’s professional role as 
representative of the sovereign.283 The power that ICE attorneys have 
in immigration cases is well established.284 As with criminal 
prosecutors, their adversaries are marginalized, powerless, and often 
indigent.285 Additionally, the consequences of pursuing a case are 
similar in a criminal trial and removal hearing.286 Like criminal 
prosecutors, ICE attorneys have vast powers as an extension of the 
sovereign. ICE attorneys’ roles are more akin to criminal prosecutors 
than that of lawyers representing the government in civil 
proceedings,287 and thus they should share the same ethical 
obligation and duties. ICE trial attorneys should be bound by the 
 
 282. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4). 
 283. See Green, supra note 186, at 625–26. 
 284. See Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 15, at 274. 
 285. Erin B. Corcoran, Bypassing Civil Gideon: A Legislative Proposal to Address the Rising 
Costs and Unmet Legal Needs of Unrepresented Immigrants, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 643, 646–52 
(2012) (discussing the stakes for immigrants, barriers to accessing competent representation and 
challenges for pro se litigants in removal proceedings). 
 286. Id. at 646–49 (discussing how the Supreme Court decision in Padilla provides support 
for the argument that the consequences of removal are akin to a criminal conviction). 
 287. Most government agency lawyers view the agency as their client and tend to view their 
ethical obligations like lawyers who have private clients. See, e.g., ABA Standing Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-387 (1994) (stating that government lawyers do 
not have an ethical obligation to review from filing a suit that is time-barred or to inform 
opposing counsel that the statute of limitation has lapsed). That is not to say that government 
lawyers do not have any additional responsibilities and that they should not be held to a higher 
standard. In fact, Chief Judge Mikva, remarking on the ethical duties for lawyers in the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, argued that the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), stating that the obligation of a representative of 
the sovereign is to not just to win a case but to see that justice is done, should apply to all 
government lawyers. Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 962 
F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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same ethical canon as federal criminal prosecutors—they should 
have “a duty to seek justice.” 
DHS should memorialize this duty in an ICE Prosecutor 
Manual. In addition, when DHS is hiring ICE trial attorneys, they 
should look for individuals who possess the virtues that make 
successful prosecutors, including “justice, courage, honesty and 
prudence.”288 DHS should provide regular trainings to new and 
experienced ICE trial attorneys on how seeking justice means 
“seeking to achieve a ‘just,’ and not necessarily the most harsh, 
result,”289 and “seeking justice” is a virtue that is acquired through 
practice.290 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Immigration prosecutors, like criminal prosecutors, not only 
represent the sovereign as a client, they are the sovereign. In other 
civil litigation or in criminal defense, the attorney represents a client 
or an organization that appoints an agent to make legal decisions. 
Prosecutors are one in the same—they represent the government, 
their client, and they decide whom the government should prosecute. 
This awesome power is held in check by the criminal prosecutors’ 
ethical and professional obligation to seek justice. Similarly, ICE 
trial attorneys decide whom to deport, not only on behalf of the 
sovereign, but also as the sovereign. ICE attorneys have been vested 
with the extraordinary power to prioritize which noncitizens may 
stay and which will go; as such, this power must be tempered with 
the simultaneous duty to seek justice. If DHS can create a culture 
where deferred action or no action is a just result, then prosecutorial 
discretion can truly be a tool to maximize resources, demonstrate 
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